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Abstract
We study a sequential learning model featuring naive agents on a network.
Agents wrongly believe their predecessors act solely on private information, so
they neglect redundancies among observed actions. We provide a simple linear
formula expressing agents’ actions in terms of network paths and use this for-
mula to completely characterize the set of networks guaranteeing eventual correct
learning. This characterization shows that on almost all networks, dispropor-
tionately influential early agents can cause herding on incorrect actions. Going
beyond existing social-learning results, we compute the probability of such mis-
learning exactly. This lets us compare likelihoods of incorrect herding, and hence
expected welfare losses, across network structures. The probability of mislearning
increases when link densities are higher and when networks are more integrated.
In partially segregated networks, divergent early signals can lead to persistent
disagreement between groups. We conduct an experiment and find that the ac-
curacy gain from social learning is twice as large on sparser networks, which is
consistent with naive inference but inconsistent with the rational-learning model.
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1 Introduction
Consider an environment with a sequence of agents facing the same decision problem in
turn, where each agent considers both her private information and the behavior of those
who came before her in reaching her decision. For instance, when consumers choose between
rival products, their decision is often informed by the choices of early customers. When
doctors decide on a treatment for their patients, they consult best practices established by
other clinicians who came before them. And when a new theory or rumor is introduced
into a society, individuals are influenced by the discussions of those who have already taken
positions on the new idea.
A key feature of these examples is that agents only observe the behavior of a certain
subset of their predecessors. For example, a consumer may know about her friends’ recent
purchases, but not the product choices of anyone outside of her social circle. In general,
each sequential social learning problem has an observation network that determines which
predecessors are observable to each agent. The observation networks associated with different
learning problems can vary in density, extent of segregation, and other structural properties.
Our main question is: how does the structure of the observation network affect the probability
of correct social learning in the long-run?
To answer this question, one must first realistically capture key aspects of how indi-
viduals process social information in such learning settings. Empirical research on social
learning, including the field experiment of Chandrasekhar, Larreguy, and Xandri (2015) and
the laboratory evidence of Eyster, Rabin, and Weizsacker (2015), suggests that humans of-
ten exhibit inferential naiveté, failing to understand that their predecessors’ actions reflect
a combination of their private information and the inference those predecessors have drawn
from the behavior of still others. Returning to the examples, a consumer may mistake a herd
on a product for evidence that everyone has positive private information about the product’s
quality. In an online community, a few early opinion makers can make a rumor go viral, due
to people not thinking through how the vast majority of the viral story’s proponents are just
following the herd and possess no private information as to the rumor’s veracity.
The present work studies the effect of the observation network on the extent of learning,
in a setting where players suffer from inferential naiveté. We analyze the theoretical implica-
tions of the most tractable model of such naiveté (as in Eyster and Rabin, 2010), which lets us
exactly compute naive agents’ probability of taking the correct action (“learning accuracy”)
on arbitrary networks. In contrast, the existing literature on social learning has focused on
the binary classification of learning situations into those where correct learning occurs with
probability one and those where learning is less than perfect with positive probability. We
obtain a richer characterization of imperfect learning, so we can compute comparative statics
of learning accuracy with respect to the network structure. We then test these comparative
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statics in an experiment, which gives a new form of evidence for inferential naiveté.
Our analysis focuses on comparisons among the network structures that imply imperfect
learning. We show this is the leading case: the only networks leading to asymptotically
correct learning for naive agents are those where every agent’s “influence” on group opinion
is negligible, a condition violated by almost all common models of social networks. Outside
of this class, we show early agents taking wrong actions can cause herding on the same
incorrect action and express the exact probability that society ends up fully convinced of the
wrong state of the world (“mislearning”) in terms of the network structure. This allows us to
study how changes in network parameters influence agents’ welfare. Since the set of networks
that preclude naive agents from always learning asymptotically is very broad, the detailed
comparative statics we can offer are crucial: imperfect learning may imply a wide range
of welfare losses. In addition, the prediction that naive learning should be differentially
inefficient on various networks motivates our empirical test of inferential naiveté, which
experimentally compares learning accuracy on sparse and dense networks.
Introducing naiveté reverses several predictions of rational social-learning models which
are at odds with empirical observations. Acemoglu, Dahleh, Lobel, and Ozdaglar (2011)’s
Bayesian learning model predicts that as long as agents can observe recent predecessors and
private signals can have unbounded informativeness, agents’ beliefs about the state of the
world will eventually settle down on a common consensus and their actions will converge
to the objectively optimal one. This prediction holds for Bayesian agents regardless of
observation network density or the extent of network segregation. By contrast, we prove
that increasing network density leads to worse social-learning outcomes. Our experiment
reported in Section 6 confirms this prediction: the gain in accuracy from social learning is
twice as large on sparse networks compared to dense networks. This finding is consistent with
redundancy neglect, as denser networks introduce more opportunities for naive agents to fail
to account for redundancies. As another example, disagreement among different communities
is common in practice. In the product-adoption domain, different subcommunities frequently
insist upon the superiority of their preferred products. With partially segregated observation
networks, we prove disagreement between different subgroups can persist even when there
are unboundedly many connections across subgroups.1 This presents a sharp contrast with
Bayesian social-learning models (and leading naive-learning models such as DeGroot), where
asymptotic agreement is a robust prediction.
Finally, studying the impact of the network structure on learning outcomes can help
us understand major societal changes. As social and technological changes restructure our
networks, social learning dynamics change as well. Most notably, the rise of the Internet has
1Segregation is extensively documented in social networks (see McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook (2001)
for a survey).
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dramatically altered the transmission of information about current events, new products,
etc. By clarifying how network structures affect learning outcomes for a society of naifs, we
aim to provide a framework for understanding such changes.
1.1 Preview of Results
Actions in our model take a simple form: assuming a continuous action space and a binary
state space, we can express each agent’s action as a linear function of her predecessors’
private signal realizations with coefficients depending on the network structure. We exploit
this expression to develop a necessary and sufficient condition for a society of naifs to learn
correctly: no agent has too much “influence.” We identify the relevant notion of influence in
a sequential learning setting with naive agents, which turns out to be related to the number
of network paths terminating at each agent. This differs from other concepts of influence
identified so far in the literature because in sequential learning settings early movers are
observed by many successors, an asymmetry which is absent in other social-learning models.
We then derive a formula for the exact probability of asymptotic social mislearning as
a function of the network structure. We apply this formula to a number of commonly
used network models and find two new effects distinguishing naive sequential learning from
rational and DeGroot learning. In a model with uniform link strength between agents,
society is more likely to mislearn when there are more links. When society is composed
of two homophilic (i.e. segregated) subgroups, mislearning is more likely when segregation
between the subgroups decreases. A theme is that changes in network structure that would
increase the speed of learning in rational and DeGroot models tend to make mislearning more
likely in our model. This is because faster convergence of beliefs creates more (neglected)
redundancy under inferential naiveté, whereas slower convergence of beliefs tends to imply
more independent sources of information get incorporated into the social consensus.
Next, we show that if agents’ actions only coarsely reflect their beliefs and society is
partially segregated, then two homophilic social subgroups can disagree forever. Because of
agents’ naiveté and the limited information conveyed by actions, disagreement can persist
even when agents observe the actions of unboundedly many individuals from the other group.
We thus contribute to an active literature on disagreement (Acemoglu, Como, Fagnani, and
Ozdaglar, 2013; Acemoglu, Chernozhukov, and Yildiz, 2016; Sethi and Yildiz, 2012) by
demonstrating that network homophily can generate divergence in beliefs.
Finally, we conduct an experiment to distinguish the naive-learning model from the
rational-learning model in terms of their comparative statics predictions. We place subjects
in sequential networks of 40 agents, where each agent has a 25% chance of observing each
predecessor in the sparse treatment and a 75% chance in the dense treatment. The subjects
know the network-generating process and must guess the binary state using their private
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signal and their social observations about the guesses made by their predecessors, with
incentives for accuracy. Prior to data collection, we pre-registered a measure of the long-run
accuracy for each network: the fraction of the final 8 agents who correctly guess the state.
Comparing this pre-registered measure on 130 sparse networks versus 130 dense networks,
we find denser networks lead to worse learning accuracy. In denser networks, the last fifth of
the agents guess correctly 5.7% more frequently than agents who have no social observations,
but this improvement is 12.6% in sparse networks. Thus, we find the accuracy gains from
social learning for these agents are twice as large in the sparse treatment as in the dense
treatment (p-value 0.0239). This is consistent with models of inferential naiveté, including
the functional form developed in Section 2 and other variants featuring a mixture of naive
agents and autarkic agents (who ignore all social information). On the other hand, we show
the doubling of accuracy gain is inconsistent with the rational model (for agents 33 through
40 in finite networks matching our experimental setup). We also find network density has
no statistically significant effect on overall guess accuracy averaged across all forty agents,
because early agents are more accurate on the dense network—as predicted by inferential
naiveté.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the remainder of Section 1 reviews related
literature. Section 2 introduces the model of naive sequential learning on a network. Section
3 contains a path-counting interpretation of actions and a necessary and sufficient condition
for correct social learning based on a suitable notion of “influence” in the network. Section
4 begins by deriving a formula for the probability of mislearning on a general network, then
applies this expression to a number of canonical network models and obtains comparative
statics on the probability of mislearning with respect to network parameters. Section 5
contains results about disagreement in homophilic societies when actions only coarsely reflect
beliefs. We present our experimental design and evidence in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
Appendix A presents some further comparative statics and Appendix B contains omitted
proofs. The Online Appendix contains several simulations to check the robustness of our
results to random networks and to different signal structures, as well as some relegated details
about the experiment.
1.2 Related Literature
1.2.1 Effect of Network Structure on Learning
Much of the literature on how network structure matters for learning outcomes has focused
on networked agents repeatedly guessing a state while learning from the same set of neighbors
each period (e.g. Bala and Goyal (1998)).
The leading behavioral model here is the DeGroot heuristic, which forms a belief in
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each period by averaging the beliefs of neighbors in the previous period. A key prediction
of DeGroot learning is that society converges to a long-run consensus (DeMarzo, Vayanos,
and Zwiebel, 2003). Moreover, this prediction will be correct in large networks as long as
the network is not too unbalanced (Golub and Jackson, 2010). So the asymptotic learning
outcomes under DeGroot and rational learning are qualititavely similar: DeMarzo, Vayanos,
and Zwiebel (2003) show that in this setting, rational agents learn the true state of the
world in finite time. In our sequential learning model, by contrast, naiveté implies a wider
scope for incorrect learning and often even disagreement, because early agents exert undue
influence on the eventual social consensus. So, it is easy to distinguish naive and Bayesian
learning.
Because the DeGroot heuristic is linear, how the network structure affects learning is well
understood. Much of this analysis focuses on how quickly beliefs converge to the consensus,
and Golub and Jackson (2012) show that the speed of convergence is determined by the
degree of homophily in the network. We find that in a sequential setting, natural changes in
network structure matter for asymptotic beliefs, not only for the speed of learning. Changing
network density, which has no effect on DeGroot learning in large networks, can substantially
alter the probability society learns correctly. Homophily now matters for this probability
and even for whether consensus is ever reached.
While DeGroot proposes the averaging rule as an ad-hoc heuristic, several recent papers
have developed behavioral microfoundations for naive learning in the repeated-interaction
setting. Molavi, Tahbaz-Salehi, and Jadbabaie (2018) axiomatize “log-linear learning”, where
the log-odds ratio of each player’s belief in period t + 1 equals to a linear combination of
the log-odds ratios of her neighbors’ beliefs from period t. This characterization resembles
our Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, which show that log-linear learning also appears in a sequential
learning model under our inferential naiveté assumption. Mueller-Frank and Neri (2015)
discuss conditions on utility functions and signal structures guaranteeing that naive agents
will learn correctly on all networks. Levy and Razin (2018) define the Bayesian Peer Influence
heuristic, which is based on the same error as the behavioral assumption we study. As in
DeGroot, their model leads to correct learning under reasonable assumptions on the network
structures. These models closely resemble ours at the level of individual behavior, but
their predictions about society’s long-run beliefs are more in line with DeGroot. As such,
changes in network structure again have a limited scope for affecting learning outcomes in
this literature.
1.2.2 Sequential Social Learning
We consider the same environment as the extensive literature on sequential social learning.
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Acemoglu, Dahleh, Lobel, and Ozdaglar (2011) and Lobel and Sadler (2015) characterize
network features that lead to correct asymptotic learning for Bayesians who move sequen-
tially. We consider instead a version of the problem where the sequential learners suffer from
naive inference. By providing a thorough understanding of rational learning in sequential
settings, this literature provides a valuable benchmark. We find that among network struc-
tures where Bayesian agents learn asymptotically, there is large variation in the probability
of mislearning and thus the extent of welfare loss for naive agents.
Several authors look at sequential naive learning on a particular network structure, usu-
ally the complete network (Eyster and Rabin, 2010; Bohren, 2016; Bohren and Hauser, 2017).
We characterize several ways in which the choice of network structure matters for the dis-
tribution of long-run outcomes. Eyster and Rabin (2014) exhibit a general class of social
learning rules, which includes naive learning with network observation, where mislearning
occurs with positive probability. We go beyond this general result by deriving expressions
for the exact probabilities of mislearning on different networks, whose associated welfare
losses cannot be compared using Eyster and Rabin (2014)’s binary classification. This lets
us develop richer understanding of how the network matters for the extent of mislearning.
1.2.3 Experimental Evidence for Naive Inference
Our experimental results add to a growing body of evidence that humans do not properly
account for correlations in social-learning settings. In a field experiment where agents interact
repeatedly with the same set of neighbors, Chandrasekhar, Larreguy, and Xandri (2015) find
agents fail to account for redundancies. Enke and Zimmermann (2018) show that correlation
neglect is prevalent even in simple environments where the observed information sources are
mechanically correlated.
Most closely related to the present work, the laboratory games in Eyster, Rabin, and
Weizsacker (2015) and Mueller-Frank and Neri (2015) directly evaluate behavioral assump-
tions matching ours. Eyster, Rabin, and Weizsacker (2015) find that on the complete obser-
vation network agents’ behavior is closer to the rational model than the naive model. On a
more complex network the naive model matches more observations than the rational model,
and there is little anti-imitation (which would be required for correct Bayesian inference).2
Mueller-Frank and Neri (2015) find most observations are consistent with the behavioral as-
sumption we study (which they call quasi-Bayesian updating) in a setting where agents have
limited information about the network. These experiments suggest naiveté may be more
likely in settings where agents either have a limited knowledge of the true network or the
network is known but very complicated. In these settings, the correct Bayesian belief given
2In the complex network, four agents move in each period after observing predecessors from previous
periods.
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one’s observations can be far from obvious, so agents are more likely to resort to behavioral
heuristics.
Unlike this previous work, our experiment tests the comparative statics predictions of
naive and rational learning. This allows us to cleanly test redundancy neglect against rational
updating. Our approach allows us to focus on long-term learning outcomes—which are
the welfare-relevant outcome as we vary the learning environment—instead of solely on
measuring individual behavior.
2 Model
2.1 Sequential Social Learning on a Network
There are two possible states of the world, ω ∈ {0, 1}, both equally likely. There is an
infinite sequence of agents indexed by i ∈ N. Agents move in order, each acting once. On
her turn, agent i observes a private signal si from signal space S, as well as the actions of
some previous agents. Then, i chooses an action ai ∈ [0, 1] to maximize the expectation of
ui(ai, ω) := −(ai − ω)2
given her belief about ω, so her chosen action corresponds to the probability she assigns to
the event {ω = 1}.
Private signals (si) are i.i.d. conditional on the state of the world. To simplify notation, we
assume that every s ∈ S satisfies 0 < P [ω = 1|si = s] < 1, so that no signal is fully revealing
about the state of the world. To avoid trivialities, assume E[P[ω = 1|si = s]|ω = 1] > 12 , so
that the signal structure is not fully uninformative.
In anticipation of the naive inference assumption we will make, we will now assume that
the signal structure has unbounded informativeness:
Assumption 1 (Unbounded Signal Informativeness). For every p ∈ (0, 1), there exists some
s ∈ S such that P [ω = 1|si = s] = p.
Assumption 1 implies private beliefs have unbounded support: the distribution of pos-
terior belief in state {ω = 1} after observing only one’s own private signal has support
[0, 1].
Our initial results in Sections 2 and 3 will not require any further assumptions on the
signal structure. For our results in Section 4, we will assume signals are Gaussian and
symmetric across the two states:
Assumption 2 (Gaussian Signals). When ω = 1, we have si ∼ N (1, σ2). When ω = 0, we
have si ∼ N (−1, σ2).
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Write Ni ⊆ {1, 2, ..., i− 1} for the subset of i’s predecessors whose actions i can observe.
Members of Ni are called neighbors of i. The sets (Ni) define a directed network. The
adjacency matrix M of the network is defined by Mi,j = 1 if j ∈ Ni and Mi,j = 0 otherwise.
Because of the sequential observation structure, M is lower-triangular with diagonal entries
all equal to zero.
If Mi,j = 1 whenever j < i, then M is associated with the complete network (up to the
constraint that earlier agents cannot observe the behavior of later agents). In that case, we
recover the commonly used social-learning model where every agent observes the actions of
all predecessors.
2.2 Naive Inference Assumption
A growing body of recent evidence in psychology and economics shows that agents learning
from peers are often not fully correct in their treatment of social structure. Instead of
calculating the optimal Bayesian behavior that fully takes into account all that they know
about the network and signal structure, agents often apply heuristic simplifications to their
environment and then act according to the solution of this simpler problem. When networks
are complicated and/or uncertain, determining Bayesian behavior can be very difficult and
these naive learning rules become especially prevalent. Motivated by this observation, we
make the following behavioral assumption, which will be maintained throughout.
Assumption 3 (Naive Inference Assumption). Each agent wrongly believes that each pre-
decessor chooses an action to maximize her expected payoff based on only her private signal,
and not on her observation of other agents.
The naive inference assumption can be equivalently described as misperceiving Nj = ∅
for all j < i. Under this interpretation, agents act as if their neighbors do not observe
anyone.
Besides the error in Assumption 3, agents are otherwise correctly specified and Bayesian.
They correctly optimize their expected utility given their mistaken beliefs.
Remark 1. Thanks to Unbounded Signal Informativeness (Assumption 1), every action that
a predecessor might take can be rationalized using only their private signal. This means a
naive agent acting according to Assumption 3 will never be “surprised” by a predecessor’s
action that she deems impossible. The social-learning model with Assumption 3 is therefore
well-defined.
Remark 2. The behavior given by Assumption 3 is cognitively simple in that it does not
rely on agent’s knowledge about the network or even knowledge about the order in which
the predecessors moved. So our model applies even to complex environments with random
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arrival of agents and/or random networks. In such environments, the naiveté assumption
may be more realistic than assuming full knowledge about the observation structure and the
move order.
In the literature, Assumption 3 was first considered in a sequential learning setting by
Eyster and Rabin (2010), who coined the term “best-response trailing naive inference”
(BRTNI) to describe this behavior. They find that even in an “information-rich” setting
where private signals have full support and actions perfectly reveal beliefs, BRTNI agents on
a complete network have a positive probability of converging to playing the wrong action.
Lemma 1 characterizes the behavior of a naive agent who sees private signal si and the
profile of neighbor actions (aj)j∈Ni . To state the lemma and our subsequent results, it is
convenient to first perform the following change of variables:
Notation 1. s˜i := ln
(
P[ω=1|si]
P[ω=0|si]
)
, a˜i := ln
(
ai
1−ai
)
In words, s˜i is the log-likelihood ratio of the events {ω = 1} and {ω = 0} given signal si,
while a˜i is the log-likelihood ratio of {ω = 1} and {ω = 0} corresponding to action ai. That
is to say, if ai is optimal given i’s beliefs, then a˜i is the log-likelihood ratio of {ω = 1} and
{ω = 0} according to i’s beliefs. Note the transformations from si to s˜i and from ai to a˜i
are bijective, so no information is lost when we relabel variables.
Lemma 1. A naive agent who observes private signal si and the profile of neighbor actions
(aj)j∈Ni plays ai such that a˜i = s˜i +
∑
j∈Ni a˜j.
The key step is to see that, due to naiveté, agent i who observes action aj wrongly
infers that j’s private log signal must satisfy s˜j = a˜j. (This inference is possible since the
continuum action set is rich enough to exactly reveal beliefs of predecessors.) This means
i’s belief about the state of the world can be expressed simply in terms of the (a˜j)j∈Ni that
she observes. The action ai is the product of the relevant likelihoods because a naive agent
assumes observed actions are independent, and therefore a˜i is the sum of the corresponding
log-likelihood ratios.
This lemma characterizes agent behavior by expressing actions in terms of observed
information. Moreover, the relevant formula is simple and linear. In Proposition 1, we will
use Lemma 1 to express actions in terms of only signals and the network structure.
We assume that agents are naive with respect to social structure, but are able to correctly
interpret private signals. This partial sophistication is not central to our analysis: it is crucial
that agents treat their social observations as independent and exchangeable, but misspecified
beliefs about signal structure would not substantially alter our findings.
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2.3 Weighted Network Edges
In Section 4, we will derive comparative statics with respect to the network structure. Be-
cause studying continuous changes in the network is more tractable than discrete changes,
we extend our network model to allow non-integer weights on network edges.
Henceforth our adjacency matrix entries can be real numbersMi,j, which we usually take
to lie in the interval [0, 1]. Below we give two interpretations of non-integer weights implying
that naive agents act according to the formula
a˜i = s˜i +
∑
j∈Ni
Mi,j a˜j,
which is a version of Lemma 1 where observed neighbor actions (a˜j)j∈Ni are assigned weights
proportional to the corresponding link weights (Mi,j)j∈Ni . The underlying idea is that agents
place more trust in or more emphasis on neighbors with whom their connections are stronger.
Noisy Observations Interpretation: This interpretation applies when signals are
Gaussian as in Assumption 2. Suppose that instead of observing a˜j, agent i observes a˜j+i,j,
where i,j ∼ N
(
0, 4
σ2
(
1
Mi,j
− 1
))
is a Gaussian random variable with mean zero and variance
decreasing inMi,j, the weight of the network edge from i to j. Note thatMi,j = 0 corresponds
i observing a signal about a˜j with “infinite variance”, i.e. a purely uninformative signal. On
the other hand, Mi,j = 1 means i observes a˜j perfectly. We then consider actions in the case
where observations are correct (or equivalently, actions of agents who mistakenly perceive
observation as noisy).
Generations Interpretation: Replace each agent i with a continuum of agents [0, 1],
interpreted as the ith generation. Each member of generation i has Mi,j chance of observing
a uniformly random member of generation j, where the randomization over observation or
no observation is independent across members of generation i. Everyone in generation i
receives the same private signal si. This setup induces a distribution over actions in each
generation, and we re-interpret a˜i as the average log-action among generation i.3
By arguments analogous to Lemma 1, it is easy to show that:
Lemma 2. Under either the Noisy Observations Interpretation or the Generations Inter-
pretation, a˜i = s˜i +
∑
j∈NiMi,j a˜j.
Intuitively, a weighted network with all link weights in the interval [0, 1] is a deterministic
version of the random network model where link (i, j) is formed with probabilityMi,j. In the
Online Appendix, we use simulations to check that several of the results proved for weighted
3A model where each generation contains a continuum of agents is central to Gagnon-Bartsch and Rabin
(2016)’s study of naive social learning. We stipulate that generation i players make i.i.d. observations of
generation j’s behavior, just as members of the same generation receive i.i.d. private signals in Gagnon-
Bartsch and Rabin (2016).
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networks in Section 4 continue to hold in the analogous random network models. We prove
our comparative statics results for weighted networks as they are analytically more tractable
than random graphs.4
Remark 3. One distinction between our model and DeGroot is that we allow for agents to
have any out-degree, while the DeGroot heuristic requires all agents’ weights sum to one.
When edges are not weighted, so that all Mi,j ∈ {0, 1}, any agent with multiple observations
has out-degree greater than one. This distinction is not just a normalization, but is in fact
the source of redundancy and naive inference.5
3 Social Influence and Learning
3.1 Path-Counting Interpretation of Actions
If players were Bayesians, then the vector of their actions (ai) would be a complicated
function of their signal realizations, (si). We now show that with naive agents, actions
actually have a simple (log-)linear expression in terms of paths in the network. This result
requires no further assumptions about the signal structure.
Below we abuse notation by using M to also refer to the n × n upper-left submatrix of
M .
Proposition 1. For each n, the actions of the first n naive agents are determined by

a˜1
...
a˜n
 = (I −M)−1 ·

s˜1
...
s˜n
 .
So, a˜i is a linear combination of (s˜j)ij=1, with coefficients given by the number of weighted
paths from i to j in the network with adjacency matrix M .6
4The major obstacle to extending proofs is that because our networks are directed and acyclic, the relevant
adjacency matrices have no non-zero eigenvalues. As a consequence, most techniques from spectral random
graph theory do not apply.
5But we can embed DeGroot learning with k agents in our model (with a slight modification so that only
the first k agents receive signals). Consider our sequential model with agents grouped into blocks of k, where
agents tk + 1, tk + 2, ..., (t + 1)k correspond to the period t actions of the k agents in the DeGroot model.
Agents 1, ..., k receive private signals and have no observations. For t ≥ 1, agents tk + 1, tk + 2, ..., (t + 1)k
do not have private signals and are connected only to the agents in the previous block, with edge weights
equal to the DeGroot weights. Under this setup, the action of agent tk + j in the sequential model is equal
to the period t action of agent j in the DeGroot model.
6Recall that M is lower-triangular due to sequential learning imposing the restriction that agent i does
not observe any agent j for j > i. Therefore, the set of paths between two agents is the same as the set of
walks between them.
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Proposition 1 expresses agent behavior in terms of only the network structure and signal
realizations. Actions are a linear combination of signals, where the coefficients have a simple
formula in terms of the adjacency matrix.
From a combinatorial perspective, the formula says that the influence of j’s signal on i’s
action depends on the number of weighted paths from i to j. “Weighted paths” means the
path passing through agents i0, ..., iK is counted with weight
∏K−1
k=0 Mik,ik+1 .
Our Proposition 1 resembles a formula for agents’ actions in Levy and Razin (2018). In
a setting of repeated interaction with a fixed set of neighbors instead of sequential social
learning, Levy and Razin (2018) also find that the influence of i’s private information on j’s
period t posterior belief depends on the number of length-t paths from i to j in the network.
3.2 Condition for Correct Learning
We will now use the representation result of Proposition 1 to study which networks lead to
mislearning by naive agents. We first define what it means for society to learn correctly in
terms of convergence of actions.
Definition 1. Society learns correctly in the long-run if (an) converges to ω in probability.
In a setting where society learns correctly in the long-run, agent n becomes very likely
to believe strongly in the true state of the world as n grows large.
We define below a notion of network influence for the sequential social-learning envi-
ronment, which plays a central role in determining whether society learns correctly in the
long-run for a broad class of signal structures.
Definition 2. Let bi,j := (I−M)−1ij be the number of weighted paths from i to j in network
M .
Without network weights, bi,j is equal to the number of paths from i to j. With network
weights, each path is counted with multiplicity equal to the product of the weights of the
edges included in the path. Because of Proposition 1, these path counts are important to
our analysis.
Definition 3. For n > i, the influence of i on n is I(i→ n) := bn,i/∑nj=1 bn,j.
That is to say, the influence of i on n is the fraction of paths from n that end at i.
An alternate definition of influence appears in Golub and Jackson (2010), who study
naive social learning in a network where agents act simultaneously each period. For them,
the influence of an agent i is determined by the unit left eigenvector of the updating matrix,
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which is proportional to i’s degree in an undirected network with symmetric weights.7 Both
definitions are related to the proportion of walks terminating at an agent, but because of
the asymmetry between earlier and later agents in the sequential setting, the distribution of
walks tends to be more unbalanced.
We will make the following connectedness assumption on M .
Assumption 4 (Connectedness Assumption). There is an integer N and constant C > 0
such that for all i > N , there exists j < N with bi,j ≥ C.
Intuitively, this says that all sufficiently late agents indirectly observe some early agent.
When all links have weight 0 or 1, this assumption holds if and only if there are only finitely
many agents who have no neighbors. If such a network fails the connectedness assumption,
then clearly the infinitely many agents without neighbors will prevent society from learning
correctly.
Proposition 2. Suppose the connectedness assumption holds and s˜i has finite variance.
Society learns correctly in the long-run if and only if limn→∞ I(i→ n) = 0 for all i.
Proposition 2 says that beliefs always converge to the truth if and only if no agent has
undue influence in the network. This is a recurring insight in research on social learning on
networks, beginning with the “royal family” example and related results in Bala and Goyal
(1998). As discussed above, our condition for learning correctly has a similar structure to
the condition in Golub and Jackson (2010). The idea that a few influential agents can
drive mislearning is also central to Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and ParandehGheibi (2010). There,
influence depends on whether agents are “forceful” and not only on their network position.
The main contribution of Proposition 2 is to identify the relevant measure of influence in
a sequential learning setting with naive agents. In our sequential setting, unlike on large
unordered networks like those in Golub and Jackson (2010), the ordering of agents creates
an asymmetry that prevents society from learning correctly on most natural networks.
The idea behind the proof is that if there were some i and  > 0 such that I(i→ n) > 
for infinitely many n, then i exerts at least  influence on all these future players. Since s˜i
is unbounded, there is a rare but positive probability event where i gets such a strong but
wrong private signal so that any future player who puts  weight on s˜i and (1− ) weight on
other signals would come to believe in the wrong state of the world with high probability.
But this would mean infinitely many players have a high probability of believing in the wrong
state of the world, so society fails to learn correctly. To gain an intuition for the converse,
first observe that a˜n = ‖~bn‖1∑ni=1 I(i → n)s˜i. In the event that ω = 1, the mean of a˜n
7When we embed the DeGroot model in our sequential model as in Footnote 5, the eigenvector-based
definition of influence for the ith DeGroot agent is equal to the limit limn→∞ I(i→ n) of i’s influence under
our definition.
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converges to infinity with n. So, provided the variance of a˜n is small relative to its mean, a˜n
will converge to infinity in probability and society will learn correctly. Since the log signals
(s˜i) are i.i.d., the variance of a˜n is small relative to its mean precisely when all of the weights
I(i → n) in the summand are small—but this is guaranteed by the condition on influence
limn→∞ I(i→ n) = 0.
4 Network Structure and Probability of Mislearning
In this section, we compare the probability of mislearning across networks where learning is
imperfect. To do so, we first derive a formula for the probability of asymptotic mislearning
as a function of the observation network. Proposition 2 implies this probability will be
non-zero on many network structures of interest. Then, applying this expression to several
canonical network structures, we compute comparative statics of this probability with respect
to network parameters.
The first network structure we consider assigns the same weight to each link. Next, we
study a homophilic network structure with agents split into two groups, allowing different
weights on links within groups and between groups. In Appendix A we consider additional
network structures: variations of these networks where link weights decay exponentially with
distance, the network where all agents have the same fixed out-degree, and a mix of naive
and autarkic agents.
4.1 Probability of Mislearning
In Section 4, we assume signals are Gaussian and symmetric across the two states as in As-
sumption 2 in order to get tractable closed-form results. From simulations using other signal
structures in the Online Appendix, the Gaussian assumption does not seem to substantially
change results.
With Gaussian signals, we can give explicit expressions for the distributions of agent
actions in each period. To this end, we first state a convenient fact about models with
binary states and Gaussian signals: the associated log-likelihood ratios also happen to have
a Gaussian distribution:
Lemma 3. Under Assumption 2, s˜i = 2si/σ2.
We now show the probability that agent n is correct about the state is related to the
ratio of `1 norm to `2 norm of the vector of weighted path counts to n’s predecessors,
~bn := (bn,1, ..., bn,n). The ratio ‖
~bn‖1
‖~bn‖2 can be viewed as a measure of distributional equality for
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the vector of weights ~bn.8 Indeed, among positive n-dimensional vectors ~bn with ‖~bn‖1 = 1,
the `1/`2 ratio is minimized by the vector ~bn = (1, 0, ..., 0) and maximized by the vector
~bn = ( 1n ,
1
n
, ..., 1
n
).
The next lemma gives the ex-ante distribution of agent n’s log-action.
Lemma 4. When ω = 1, the log-action of agent n is distributed as a˜n ∼ N
(
2
σ2‖~bn‖1, 4σ2‖~bn‖22
)
.
As ‖~bn‖1‖~bn‖2 increases, the probability of agent n playing higher actions in state ω = 1 also
increases. In other words, the agent is more likely to be correct about the state when the
vector of path counts is more evenly distributed. This should make intuitive sense as she is
more likely to be correct when her action is the average of many independent signals with
roughly equal weights, and less likely to be correct when her action puts disproportionally
heavy weights on a few signals.
The proof of Lemma 4 first expresses a˜n =
∑n
i=1 bn,is˜i using Proposition 1, then observes
(si) are distributed i.i.d.N (1, σ2) conditional on ω = 1. This means (s˜i) are also conditionally
i.i.d. Gaussian random variables, due to Lemma 3. As a sum of conditionally i.i.d. Gaussian
random variables, the action a˜n is itself Gaussian. The result follows from calculating the
mean and variance of this sum.
As a consequence, we can express in terms of the network structure the ex-ante probability
that agent n puts more confidence in the state being ω = 0 when in fact ω = 1. This gives
the key result that lets us compare the extent of imperfect learning on different networks.
Theorem 1. The probability that agent n thinks the incorrect state is more likely than the
correct one is P[a˜n < 0|ω = 1] = Φ
(
− 1
σ
· ‖~bn‖1‖~bn‖2
)
.
For the remainder of this section, we will study specific weighted networks where the ratio
‖~bn‖1
‖~bn‖2 can be expressed in terms of interpretable network parameters. Our basic technique
is to count paths on a given network using an appropriate recurrence relation, and then to
apply Lemma 4 and Theorem 1. This will allow us to relate network parameters to learning
outcomes.
For the remainder of this section, let the signal variance σ2 = 1. Note that in the limit as
signals become uninformative (σ2 →∞), the probability of correct learning converges to 12 .
4.2 Uniform Weights
The simplest network we consider assigns the same weight q ∈ [0, 1] to each feasible link.
This network is analogous to an Erdős–Rényi random network, where each feasible link is
8In fact, the ratio of `1 to `2 norm has been used in the applied mathematics literature as a measure
of normalized sparsity in matrix factorization and blind deconvolution (Hoyer, 2004; Krishnan, Tay, and
Fergus, 2011).
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present with a fixed probability q. By varying the value of q, we can ask how link density
affects the probability of mislearning, which we now define.
Definition 4. Society mislearns when limn→∞ an = 0 but ω = 1, or when limn→∞ an = 1
but ω = 0.
Society mislearns when all late enough agents are very confident but incorrect.
Proposition 3. When q ∈ (0, 1], agents’ actions an converge to 0 or 1 almost surely. The
probability that society mislearns is Φ
(
−
√
q+2
q
)
where Φ is the standard Gaussian distribution
function. This probability is strictly increasing in q.
The first statement of the proposition tells us that agents eventually agree on the state
of the world, and that these beliefs are arbitrarily strong after some time. These consensus
beliefs need not be correct, however. The probability of society converging to incorrect beliefs
is non-zero for all positive q, and increases in q. When the observational network is more
densely connected, society is more likely to be wrong, as in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Probability that society learns correctly (an → ω) on a network where all links have
weight q. (Proposition 3 shows this probability is 1 − Φ
(
−
√
q+2
q
)
under the normalization
σ = 1, but one can similarly show this probability is 1−Φ
(
− 1
σ
·
√
q+2
q
)
more generally.) See
Remark 5 for the discontinuity at q = 0.
When the observation network is sparse (i.e. q is low), early agents’ actions convey a
large amount of independent information because they do not influence each other too much.
This facilitates later agents’ learning. For high q, early agents’ actions are highly correlated,
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so later naive agents cannot recover the true state as easily.9 A related intuition compares
agents’ beliefs about network structure to the actual network: as q grows, agents’ beliefs
about the network structure differ more and more from the true network. To complement
this theoretical result, in Section 6 we conduct a sequential learning experiment to evaluate
the comparative static. In line with the intuition above, we find that human subjects indeed
do worse in the learning game when the density of the observation network increases.
The proof relies on the recurrence relation bn,i = (1 + q)bn−1,i. To see this recurrence
holds, let Ψn be the set of all paths from n to i and Ψn−1 be the set of all paths from n−1 to
i. For each ψ ∈ Ψn−1, ψ = (n− 1)→ j1 → j2 → ...→ i, we associate two paths ψ′ , ψ′′ ∈ Ψn,
with ψ′ = n → j1 → j2 → ... → i and ψ′′ = n → (n − 1) → j1 → j2 → ... → i. This
association exhaustively enumerates all paths in Ψn as we consider all ψ ∈ Ψn−1. Path ψ′
has the same weight as ψ since they have the same length, while path ψ′′ has q fraction of
the weight of ψ since it is longer by one. This shows the weight of all paths in Ψn is equal
to 1 + q times the weight of all paths in Ψn−1, hence bn,i = (1 + q)bn−1,i.
Remark 4. The case q = 1 is studied in Eyster and Rabin (2010), who use a slightly different
signal structure. In their setting, Eyster and Rabin (2010) show that agents’ beliefs converge
to 0 or 1 almost surely and derive a non-zero lower bound on the probability of converging
to the incorrect belief. By contrast, our result gives the exact probability of converging to
the wrong belief for any q ∈ (0, 1], under a Gaussian signal structure.
Remark 5. There is a discontinuity at q = 0. As q approaches 0, the probability of society
eventually learning correctly approaches 1.10 But when q = 0, each agent only observes her
own private signal. In this case there is no social learning since all agents choose actions equal
to their signals. This non-convergence of actions means that society never learns correctly.
Remark 6. The idea that increasing the intensity of communication increases the probability
that society will converge to wrong beliefs is also discussed by Mobius, Phan, and Szeidl
(2015), but under a different mechanism—they argue naive heuristics should become more
prevalent as the greater communication intensity leads to a more complex communication
network. Our Proposition 3 shows that even when we hold fixed the severity of society’s
naiveté, a network featuring more communication is more likely to lead society astray.
In Appendix A.1 we extend the result to networks where each agent has a fixed out-degree
d and find that the probability of mislearning is increasing in the out-degree. In Appendix
A.2, we extend the uniform weights network to incorporate recency effect: the weight of
the link between i and j is δi−j for some 0 < δ < 1, so that more recent predecessors
get more weight. Intuitively, this models a situation where agents are better connected to
9Sadler (2017) discusses a related intuition in the context of experimentation with social learning. In
denser networks there is less experimentation, and thus agents are more likely to be wrong about the state.
10Although the speed of learning slows.
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or place more trust in peers who are closer to them in the network. The conclusion that
denser network causes more mislearning extends naturally: when δ > 12 , the probability of
mislearning is increasing in δ. (When δ < 12 , the actions (an) almost surely do not converge.
Society learns correctly in the long-run on the boundary δ = 12 .)
We also expect the comparative static result to be robust to variations on behavior when
agents exhibit redundancy neglect. As an example, we consider a mix of naive agents and
autarkic agents who follow only private signals in Appendix A.3. The naive agents eventually
agree, and the probability these agents settle on the correct consensus decreases in q.
4.3 Two Groups
We next consider a network with two groups and different weights for links within groups
and between groups. This is a deterministic version of a simple stochastic block model,
which will be discussed further in Section 5. By varying the link weights, we will consider
how homophily (i.e. segregation in communication) changes learning outcomes.
Odd-numbered agents are in one group and even-numbered agents are in a second group.
Each feasible within-group link has weight qs (s for same) and each between-group link has
weight qd (d for different), so that for i > j, the link Mi,j = qs if i ≡ j (mod 2) and Mi,j = qd
otherwise. Figure 2 illustrates the first four agents in a two-groups network.
Figure 2: First four agents in a two-groups network. Odd-numbered agents are in one group
(blue) while even-numbered agents are in another group (red). A solid arrow indicates a
link between an agent and a predecessor from the same group. These links have weight qs.
A dashed arrow indicates a link between an agent and a predecessor from a different group.
These links have weight qd.
We denote the probability of mislearning with weights qs and qd as ξ(qs, qd).
Proposition 4. When qs ∈ [0, 1] and qd ∈ (0, 1], agents’ actions an converge almost surely to
0 or 1. The partial derivatives of the mislearning probability ξ(qs, qd) satisfy ∂ξ∂qd >
∂ξ
∂qs
> 0,
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i.e. the probability is increasing in qs and qd, but increasing qd has a larger effect than
increasing qs.
The first statement again says that agents eventually agree on the state and eventually
have arbitrarily strong beliefs. The fact that ξ is increasing in qs and qd is another example
of higher link density implying more mislearning. The comparison ∂ξ
∂qd
> ∂ξ
∂qs
tells us that
more integrated (i.e. less homophilic) networks are more likely to herd on the wrong state
of the world.
Convergence of beliefs is more subtle with two groups, as we might imagine the two
homophilic groups holding different beliefs asymptotically. This does not happen because
agents have continuous actions that allow them to precisely convey the strength of their
beliefs. As such, eventually one group will develop sufficiently strong beliefs to convince the
other. (In Section 5, however, we will see that disagreement between two homophilic groups
is possible with a coarser action space.)
To see that convergence must occur, observe that the belief of a later agent n depends
mostly on the number of paths from that agent to early agents (and those agents’ signal
realizations). When n is large, most paths from agent n to an early agent pass between the
two groups many times. So the number of paths does not depend substantially on agent n’s
group. Therefore, agent n’s belief does not depend substantially on whether n is in the odd
group or the even group.11
Coleman (1958)’s homophily index equals to qs−qd
qs+qd for this weighted network. To explore
how homophily affects mislearning probability while holding fixed the average degree of each
agent, we consider the total derivative d
d∆ξ(qs + ∆, qd−∆). To interpret, we are considering
the marginal effect on mislearning of a ∆ increase to all the within-group link weights,
coupled with a ∆ decrease to all the between-groups link weights. These two perturbations,
applied simultaneously, leave each agent with roughly the same total degree and increases
the homophily index by 2∆
qs+qd . Using the chain rule and Proposition 4,
d
d∆ξ(qs + ∆, qd −∆) =
∂ξ
∂qs
− ∂ξ
∂qd
< 0,
which means increasing the homophily index of the society and fixing average degrees always
decreases the probability of mislearning. Note that this result holds regardless of whether
society is currently homophilic (qs > qd) or heterophilic (qs < qd).
An important insight from the literature about social learning on networks is that beliefs
converge more slowly on more segregated networks. This intuition is formalized for DeGroot
11Each path transitions between the two groups, and eventually the probability of ending in a given group
is approximately independent of the starting group. This is analogous to a Markov chain approaching its
stationary distribution.
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learning in Golub and Jackson (2012), which defines a new measure of homophily and shows
that measure also describes the speed of learning. In our model, faster convergence of beliefs
tends to imply a higher probability of incorrect beliefs. When beliefs converge quickly, agents
are putting far too much weight on early movers, while when beliefs converge more slowly
agents wait for more independent information. Since agents eventually agree, segregation
helps society form strong beliefs more gradually.
In Appendix A.2, we extend the two-groups network to model recency effect: for some
0 < δ < 1, the weight of the link between i and j (with i > j) is δi−jqs when i and j are in
the same group and δi−jqd otherwise. The conclusions of Proposition 4 remain robust under
this extension. Namely, there exists a threshold δ0(qs, qd) such that when δ > δ0(qs, qd), the
probability of mislearning is increasing in each of δ, qs, qd, but increasing qd has a larger effect
than increasing qs. If δ < δ0(qs, qd), then almost surely the actions (an) do not converge.
5 Disagreement
In Section 4.3, we saw that even on segregated networks agents eventually agree on the state
of the world. This agreement relies crucially on the richness of the action space available
to agents, which allows agents to communicate the strength of their beliefs. In this section,
we modify our model so that the action space is binary. With binary actions, two groups
can disagree about the state of the world even when the number of connections across the
groups is unbounded.
The contrasting results for binary-actions model versus the continuum-actions model echo
a similar contrast in the rational-herding literature, where society herds on the wrong action
with positive probability when actions coarsely reflect beliefs (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani,
Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992), but almost surely converges to the correct action when the
action set is rich enough (Lee, 1993). Interestingly, while the rational-herding literature finds
that an unboundedly informative signal structure prevents herding on the wrong action even
when actions coarsely reflect beliefs (Smith and Sørensen, 2000), we will show below that
even with Gaussian signals two groups may disagree with positive probability.
Suppose that the state of the world and signal structure are the same as in Section 2,
but agents now choose binary actions ai ∈ {0, 1}. Agents still maximize the expectation of
ui(ai, ω) := −(ai− ω)2 given their beliefs about ω. This utility function now implies that an
agent chooses the action corresponding to the state of world she believes is more likely. With
the action space changed, we no longer need unbounded signal informativeness (Assumption
1).
In this section, we consider the random network analog of the two-groups model from
Section 4.3, which was studied there in a weighted networks setting (the conclusions about
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disagreement are the same on random networks and weighted networks). Odd- and even-
numbered agents are in different groups. Let qs be the probability of link formation within
groups and qd be the probability of link formation between groups. So when i > j, agent i
observes agent j with probability qs if i ≡ j (mod 2), and with probability qd otherwise. This
is a simple directed case of stochastic block networks, which have been used in economics
to consider the effect of homophily on speed of learning (Golub and Jackson, 2012) and are
widely studied in computer science and related fields (e.g. Airoldi, Blei, Feinberg, and Xing,
2008). Our result extends to two groups of unequal sizes as long as for all later agents, the
expected number of observations within their group is larger than the expected number of
observations from the other group.
We will state our disagreement result for symmetric binary signals and for Gaussian
signals. These functional forms can be relaxed without altering the result, and the key
assumptions on the signal structure are stated in the proof.12 Most importantly, signal
structures with fat tails need to be ruled out so that the probability of an agent seeing
an extremely informative private signal that overturns the information contained in her
neighbor’s actions vanishes to zero fast enough along the sequence.
Assumption 5 (Binary Signals). si ∈ {0, 1}, and si = ω with probability p > 12 in either
state.
This says that signals are binary and symmetric. Note that since all agents choose binary
actions, the naive inference assumption still makes sense even with binary signals.
Theorem 2. Consider a random network with agents partitioned into odd and even groups,
where the probabilities of link formation are qs for two agents in the same group and qd for
two agents in different groups. Suppose qs > qd > 0, agents play binary actions, and the en-
vironment either has Gaussian signals from Assumption 2 or binary signals from Assumption
5. Then there is a positive probability (with respect to the joint distribution over network
structures and signal realizations) that all odd-numbered agents choose action 0 while all
even-numbered agents choose action 1.
The two groups can disagree even though agent n observes approximately nqd/2 agents
from the other group (when n is large) taking opposite actions. Note that in this random
network model, an agent counts each observed predecessor from her own social group with
the same weight as an observed predecessor from the opposite social group—the disagreement
result will only be strengthened if we assume agents discount observations from the opposite
social group. By contrast, with rational agents and Gaussian signals, Theorem 2 of Acemoglu,
Dahleh, Lobel, and Ozdaglar (2011) implies the groups agree asymptotically.
12This result also holds under any signal structure satisfying the three technical assumptions of No Unin-
formative Signals, Symmetry, and Thin Tails defined in the proof of Theorem 2.
21
This result adds a new mechanism to the literature on public disagreement. Acemoglu,
Como, Fagnani, and Ozdaglar (2013) also study a model generating disagreement via network
learning, but their disagreement takes the form of persistent fluctuations in beliefs whereas
our model predicts that two subgroups will converge to opposite extreme beliefs with positive
probability. In Acemoglu, Como, Fagnani, and Ozdaglar (2013), disagreement arises from
“stubborn” agents who hold different initial opinions and never change their mind. Here, the
key forces driving disagreement are the segregated network structure as well as the tendency
of naive agents to herd. Bohren and Hauser (2017) also study disagreement in a binary
sequential learning setting with behavioral agents, but their results concern disagreement
on a complete network among agents with different types of behavioral biases. By contrast,
our Theorem 2 says when all agents use the same naive heuristic, they can still disagree by
virtue of belonging to two different homophilic social groups.
The lack of rich actions that perfectly reveal players’ beliefs is central to the disagreement
result. This assumption cannot be relaxed even for one of the groups. The next proposition
considers a modification where signals are Gaussian13 and one group has a rich action set as
in the Section 2 model, while the other group has binary actions. No matter how homophilic
the two groups are, they cannot disagree in the long-run. Indeed, whenever the group with
the rich action set converges, the group with binary actions also converges to playing the
action that corresponds to the same state of the world.
Proposition 5. Let qs, qd > 0 be arbitrary and suppose the environment has Gaussian signals
from Assumption 2. Suppose odd-numbered agents choose actions from the interval [0, 1], but
even-numbered agents choose actions from the binary set {0, 1}. For x ∈ {0, 1}, conditional
on the actions of odd-numbered agents converging to x, the actions of even-numbered agents
also converge to x with probability 1.
The intuition is that with a continuum of actions, an agent can express extreme certainty
in some state of the world. But binary actions, at least from the perspective of a naive learner,
have limited informativeness about predecessors’ beliefs. Although an even-numbered agent
tends to observe more predecessors from her own group than from the other group, one
observation of an extreme continuous action from the odd-numbered group can cancel out
an arbitrarily large number of opposing, binary actions from the even-numbered group. In
the end, the continuous-action group acts as a leader and the binary-action group follows
whatever trend the continuous-action group sets, even in the presence of homophily.
13Note that the naive inference assumption does not have a clear interpretation when some agents have
continuous actions and everyone receives a binary private signal, because some of the observed neighbors’
actions cannot arise from only from their private signals.
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6 Experimental Evidence
6.1 Theoretical Motivation
Proposition 3 suggests an empirical test for the naive inference assumption: in the context
of sequential learning on random networks, does increasing the link-formation probability q
cause more mislearning? In this section, we experimentally test this comparative static in
networks of 40 agents by comparing learning outcomes when q = 14 and q =
3
4 . For the sake
of experimental clarity we assume that the action space is binary.14 Our experimental setup
features Gaussian signals, binary actions, and random networks as in Section 5.
The naive-learning model and the rational-learning model make competing predictions
about this comparative static. The intuition for naive learning comes from Proposition
3, which suggests that in this case later agents are less likely to correctly guess the state
on denser networks. We do not expect human subjects to behave exactly as in the naive
model—for example, the meta-analysis of Weizsäcker (2010) reports that laboratory subjects
in sequential learning games suffer from autarky bias, underweighting their social observa-
tions relative to the payoff-maximizing strategy. However, the comparative static prediction
of the naive model remains robust even after introducing any fraction of autarkic agents, as
shown in Proposition A.4 in the Appendix.
We compute the probabilities of correct actions with 40 naive agents and the network and
signal structures corresponding to our experimental design, which we describe in Section 6.2.
Because naive agents’ actions only depend on the number of their predecessors choosing L
and R and not the order of these actions, recursively calculating the distributions of actions
is computationally feasible (see Appendix C.2 for details). As shown in Figure 3, early
naive agents do worse under q = 14 because there is very little social information, but the
comparison quickly switches as we examine later naive agents due to the same logic as in
Proposition 3.
On the other hand, the rational learning model predicts that later agents will have either
similar or greater accuracy on the dense q = 34 network compared to the sparse q =
1
4 network.
Asymptotically, Acemoglu, Dahleh, Lobel, and Ozdaglar (2011) show that in an environment
matching our experimental setup, rational agents will learn the true state in the long-run,
regardless of the network density. We can confirm that 40 rational agents are enough to
approach this asymptotic learning limit when q = 34 . To do this, we compute a lower bound
for the probability of correct learning for each agent i, under parameter values matching
our experimental design and assuming all agents are rational Bayesians (see Appendix C.1
for details). This lower bound is based on agent strategies depending only on their private
14We felt subjects would have difficulty interpreting continuous actions of neighbors, and that their inter-
pretation would be sensitive to the framing of the experiment.
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Figure 3: Learning on Erdős–Rényi random networks with 40 naive agents, binary actions
and σ2 = 4. Networks with link probabilities q = 14 (blue curve) and q =
3
4 (red curve).
signal and the action of just one neighbor, as in the neighbor choice functions in Lobel and
Sadler (2015). This exercise shows that the 33rd rational agent is correct at least 96.8% of
the time, with the lower bound on the probability of correct learning continuing to increase
up to the 40th agent, who is correct at least 97.5% of the time. In addition to suggesting that
the asymptotic result of Acemoglu, Dahleh, Lobel, and Ozdaglar (2011) very likely holds by
the 40th agent, the fact that this lower bound for accuracy on the dense network is so close
to perfect learning proves the 40th rational agent could not perform substantially better on
the sparse network.
Finally, we intuitively expect more connections to also help rational agents in the short-
and medium-run as they can adjust for potential redundancies in information. For example,
on the complete network with continuous actions, rational agents can back out private signals
of every predecessor by observing their actions, so every agent i does better on the complete
network than under any less dense network structure.
We experimentally test the predictions of the naive and the rational models by evaluating
the comparative static as we vary network density. We thus provide indirect evidence for the
naive inference assumption, complementing the direct measurement of behavior in Eyster,
Rabin, and Weizsacker (2015) and Mueller-Frank and Neri (2015).
Beyond providing another form of evidence, we believe this indirect test is a valuable
complement to direct tests of behavior because we use the welfare-relevant outcome, namely
the accuracy of beliefs, as our dependent variable. Even if individual behavior tends to match
redundancy neglect models in simple or stylized settings, one might be concerned that in
practice theoretical results about aggregate learning need not hold for complex environ-
ments. So if a policy intervention altering the observation network is feasible, for example,
experiments using welfare-relevant outcomes as their dependent variables give more explicit
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guidance as to the consequences of that change.
6.2 Experimental Design
We conducted our experiment on the online labor platform Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk)
using Qualtrics survey software.
We pre-registered our experimental protocol and regression specification, including the
dependent variable to measure the accuracy of social learning and the target sample size,
prior to the start of the experiment in August 2017. The pre-registration document is
included in the Online Appendix and may also be accessed via the registry website at
https://aspredicted.org/yp6eq.pdf.
We recruited 1040 subjects satisfying the selection criteria described in the Online Ap-
pendix. Each subject also needed to complete three comprehension questions (which were
scenarios in the game with a dominant choice); MTurk users who incorrectly answered one
or more comprehension questions were excluded from the experiment. The experiment was
carried out in fall 2017.
Each trial consisted of 40 agents who were asked to each make a binary guess between
two a priori equally likely states of the world, L (for left) and R (for right). The states
were color-coded to make instructions and observations more reader-friendly. Agents are
assigned positions in the sequence and move in order. Each MTurk subject participated in
10 trials, all in the same position (depending on when they participated in the experiment).
The grouping of subjects into trials was independent across trials. Subjects received $0.25
for completing the experiment and $0.25 per correct guess, for a maximum possible payment
of $2.75. Subjects ordinarily took less than 10 minutes to complete their participation and
earned on average $2.08, so the incentives were quite large for an MTurk task.
In each trial, every agent received a private signal, which had the Gaussian distribution
N (−1, 4) in state L and the Gaussian distribution N (1, 4) in state R. These distributions
were presented visually in the instructions. Along with the value of their signal, subjects
were told the probability of each state conditional on only their private signal.
Each trial was also associated with a density parameter, either q = 14 or q =
3
4 . A
random network was generated for each trial by linking each agent with each predecessor
with probability q. Each MTurk subject was assigned into either the “sparse” or the “dense”
treatment, then placed into 10 trials either all with q = 14 or all with q =
3
4 . So there were
520 subjects and 130 trials for each treatment. Agents were told the actions of each linked
predecessor and the link probability q (but not the full realized network, which could not be
presented succinctly).
In each trial agents viewed their private signal and any social observations and were
asked to guess the state. States, signals, and networks were independently drawn across
25
trials. Experimental instructions and an example of a choice screen from a trial are shown
in the Online Appendix.
6.3 Results
Let yi,j be the indicator random variable with yi,j = 1 if agent i in trial j correctly guesses
the state, yi,j = 0 otherwise. Define y˜j := 18
∑40
i=33 yi,j as the fraction of the last eight
agents in trial j who correctly guess the state. We test learning outcomes for the final
eight agents because welfare depends on long-run learning outcomes in large societies and
these agents better approximate long-run outcomes. By using only her private signal, an
agent can correctly guess the state 69.15% of the time.15 We call y˜j − 0.6915 the gain from
social learning in trial j, as this quantity represents improvement relative to the autarky
benchmark.
We find that the average gain from social learning is 8.73 percentage points for the q = 14
treatment and 4.12 percentage points for the q = 34 treatment. Social learning improves
accuracy on the sparse networks by twice as much as on the dense networks. To test for
statistical significance, we consider the regression
y˜j = β0 + β1qj + j
where qj ∈ {14 , 34} is the network density parameter for trial j. Recall that each subject was
assigned into ten random trials with the same network density and in the same sequential
position. This means for two different trials j ′ 6= j ′′ , the error terms j′ and j′′ are close to
independent since there are likely very few subjects who participated in both trials. Indeed,
our estimates are identical whether we use robust standard errors or not.
We estimate β1 = −0.092 with a p-value of 0.0239 (see Table 1). These findings are
consistent with naive updating but not with rational updating, as discussed in Section 6.1.16
This difference in the gains from social learning is not driven by different rates of autarky
among the two treatments for the last eight agents. We say an agent goes against her signal
if she guesses L when her signal is positive or guesses R when her signal is negative. Within
the last eight rounds, there are 138 instances of agents going against their signals in the q = 14
treatment, which is very close to the 136 instances of the same under the q = 34 treatment.
However, when agents go against their signals in the last eight rounds, they correctly guess
15In fact, 94% of the subjects assigned to the first position (who have no social observations) correctly use
their private signal.
16We pre-registered average accuracy in the last 8 rounds (i.e last 20% of agents) as the dependent variable
for the experiment, but the regression result is robust to other definitions of y˜j . When y˜j encodes average
accuracy among the last m agents for any 4 ≤ m ≤ 12 (i.e. between last 10% and last 30% of the agents),
the estimate for β1 remains negative.
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(1) (2)
FractionCorrect FractionCorrect
NetworkDensity -0.0923 -0.0923
(0.0406) (0.0406)
Constant 0.802 0.802
(0.0227) (0.0218)
Observations 260 260
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.016
(1) without robust SEs; (2) with robust SEs
Table 1: Regression results for the effect of network density on learning outcomes.
the state 81.88% of the time under the q = 14 treatment, but only 71.32% of the time under
the q = 34 treatment. This shows the observed difference in accuracy is due to social learning
being differentially effective on the two network structures.
However, the q = 34 treatment yields better learning outcomes for early agents. For
agents 10 through 20, the average guess accuracy is 72.24% under the q = 14 treatment
and 73.22% under the q = 34 treatment. As such, if we replace the dependent variable in
the pre-registered regression with overall accuracy y¯j := 140
∑40
i=1 yi,j, then we do not find a
statistically significant estimate for β1 (q-value of 0.663). This result is consistent with the
naive-learning model: according to the simulations in Section 6.1, for early agents accuracy
is higher under q = 34 , but eventually accuracy is higher under q =
1
4 . The point of overtaking
happens at a later round in practice than in theory, because our experimental subjects rely
more on their private signal than predicted by the naive model,17 consistent with the meta-
analysis of Weizsäcker (2010).
We do not directly test alternate behavioral models for two reasons. First, given the
complex signal and network structures, such tests will be very noisy in our data. Second, be-
cause the spaces of possible networks and actions have very high dimension, determining the
action each agent would take assuming common knowledge of rationality is computationally
infeasible. However, in the next subsection we provide some evidence that our findings are
driven by naive herding rather than other behavioral mechanisms.
6.4 Evidence of herding
In this section, we present three pieces of evidence suggesting that naive herding is the
mechanism generating the differential learning learning accuracy in the two treatments.
17The overall frequency of agents going against their signals was 36.8% of the predicted frequency under
the naive model.
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(1) Distribution of overall accuracy. Figure 4 in Appendix D plots the distributions
subjects who correctly guess the state in the q = 14 and q =
3
4 treatments. The distribution
under q = 34 has more extreme values than the one under q =
1
4 , and also a larger standard
deviation (11.36 percentage points versus 9.12 percentage points). This is suggestive evidence
for naive herding, as in the dense networks setting we both observe more games where agents
do very badly overall (from herding on the wrong state) and more games where agents do
very well overall (from herding on the correct state).
(2) Effect of misleading private signals for early agents on the accuracy of
later agents. Call a private signal misleading if it is positive while the state is L, or if it is
negative while the state is R. If naive herding is the mechanism, we would expect misleading
early signals to be more harmful for eventual learning accuracy on denser networks than on
sparser networks. To test this, we expand our baseline regression to include two additional
regressors: the numbermj of the first fifth of agents who receive misleading signals in network
j, and its interaction effect with network density. That is, we estimate
y˜j = β0 + β1qj + β2mj + γ(qjmj) + j.
The difference in the marginal effect of a misleading early signal for learning accuracy on the
dense network (q = 34) versus on the sparse network (q =
1
4) is
1
2γ in the above specification.
As reported in Table 4 in Appendix D, we find γ = 0.05 with a p-value of 0.0923. This
means each misleading signal among the first fifth of agents harms the average accuracy of
the last fifth of agents in the same game by an extra 2.5 percentage points in dense networks
compared to sparse networks.
(3) Average uncertainty. Based on simulation evidence, we expect naive agents to
exhibit more agreement within denser networks. To test this prediction in the data, we
consider for each game a set of 30 moving windows centered around periods 6, 7, ... 35,
with each window spanning 11 consecutive periods. For each game j and each window w, we
compute rj,w ∈ {0, 111 , ..., 1} as the fraction of 11 agents in the window who guessed R, and
we let uj,w := rj,w · (1− rj,w) be a measure of uncertainty within the window.18 In windows
where agents exhibit a greater degree of agreement, we will see a lower uj,w. Under herding,
we expect lower uncertainty on denser networks, as higher density accelerates convergence
to a (possibly mistaken) social consensus. We find in the data that the average uj,w is lower
among sparse networks than dense networks for all but 1 out of 30 windows. Numerically,
the naive herding theory predicts lower average uj,w on denser networks in all 30 windows.
18The value of uj,w would be unchanged if we instead defined rj,w as the fraction of the 11 agents in
window w who correctly guessed the state.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have explored the influence of network structures on learning outcomes when
agents move sequentially and suffer from inferential naiveté. We have compared long-run
welfare across networks, both theoretically by deriving the exact probabilities of mislearning
on arbitrary networks, and experimentally by measuring learning accuracy on sparse and
dense networks.
We have studied the simplest possible social-learning environment to focus on the effect of
network structure, but several extensions are straightforward. Analogs of our general results
hold for finite state spaces with more than two elements, where we can define a log-likelihood
ratio for each pair of states. We can also make the order of moves random and unknown, in
which case naive behavior with a given turn order is the same as when that order is certain.
Broadly speaking, our model of naive sequential learning is likely to fit well in settings
with these three key features: (1) players’ decisions are not too close to simultaneous; (2)
decisions are hard to modify; (3) the network is complex. The motivating examples from
the introduction, including product adoption by a group of consumers and treatment choice
by generations of medieval doctors, are well-approximated by a sequential timing structure.
Also, once made, these decisions are difficult to reverse.
The third key feature—a complex network—encourages naiveté in at least two ways.
First, naive inference is more likely when the rational action is hard to calculate. Second,
in complex networks agents are more likely to learn from only predecessors’ actions rather
than communicate using arbitrarily complex messages—for example reporting the source of
every piece of information they have accumulated so far. This kind of direct communica-
tion and source-tagging appear more natural in small, close-knit communities, such as the
college-campus community where Mobius, Phan, and Szeidl (2015)’s experiment took place.
But in many natural sequential-learning problems players are geographically or temporally
dispersed, such as in the two examples above. In these settings, it may be too costly to keep
track of the original sources of all pieces of information, and in any event close to impossible
to communicate this nuanced information to future generations.
References
Acemoglu, D., V. Chernozhukov, and M. Yildiz (2016): “Fragility of asymptotic
agreement under Bayesian learning,” Theoretical Economics, 11, 187–225.
Acemoglu, D., G. Como, F. Fagnani, and A. Ozdaglar (2013): “Opinion fluctu-
ations and disagreement in social networks,” Mathematics of Operations Research, 38,
1–27.
29
Acemoglu, D., M. A. Dahleh, I. Lobel, and A. Ozdaglar (2011): “Bayesian learn-
ing in social networks,” Review of Economic Studies, 78, 1201–1236.
Acemoglu, D., A. Ozdaglar, and A. ParandehGheibi (2010): “Spread of (mis)
information in social networks,” Games and Economic Behavior, 70, 194–227.
Airoldi, E. M., D. M. Blei, S. E. Feinberg, and E. P. Xing (2008): “Mixed Mem-
bership Stochastic Block Models,” Journal of Machine Learning Research, 9, 1981–2014.
Bala, V. and S. Goyal (1998): “Learning from neighbours,” Review of Economic Studies,
65, 595–621.
Banerjee, A. V. (1992): “A simple model of herd behavior,” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 107, 797–817.
Bikhchandani, S., D. Hirshleifer, and I. Welch (1992): “A theory of fads, fashion,
custom, and cultural change as informational cascades,” Journal of Political Economy,
100, 992–1026.
Bohren, J. A. (2016): “Informational herding with model misspecification,” Journal of
Economic Theory, 163, 222–247.
Bohren, J. A. and D. Hauser (2017): “Bounded Rationality And Learning: A Frame-
work and A Robustness Result,” Mimeo.
Chandrasekhar, A. G., H. Larreguy, and J. P. Xandri (2015): “Testing models of
social learning on networks: Evidence from a lab experiment in the field,” Mimeo.
Coleman, J. (1958): “Relational analysis: the study of social organizations with survey
methods,” Human Organization, 17, 28–36.
DeMarzo, P. M., D. Vayanos, and J. Zwiebel (2003): “Persuasion bias, social influ-
ence, and uni-dimensional opinions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 909–968.
Enke, B. and F. Zimmermann (2018): “Correlation neglect in belief formation,” Review
of Economic Studies.
Eyster, E. and M. Rabin (2010): “Naive herding in rich-information settings,” American
Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2, 221–243.
——— (2014): “Extensive Imitation is Irrational and Harmful,” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 129, 1861–1898.
30
Eyster, E., M. Rabin, and G. Weizsacker (2015): “An Experiment on Social Mis-
learning,” Mimeo.
Gagnon-Bartsch, T. and M. Rabin (2016): “Naive Social Learning, Mislearning, and
Unlearning,” Mimeo.
Golub, B. and M. O. Jackson (2010): “Naive learning in social networks and the wisdom
of crowds,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2, 112–149.
——— (2012): “How Homophily Affects the Speed of Learning and Best-Response Dynam-
ics,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127, 1287–1338.
Hoeffding, W. (1963): “Probability Inequalities for Sums of Bounded Random Variables,”
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 58, 13–30.
Hoyer, P. O. (2004): “Non-negative matrix factorization with sparseness constraints,”
Journal of Machine Learning Research, 5, 1457–1469.
Krishnan, D., T. Tay, and R. Fergus (2011): “Blind deconvolution using a normalized
sparsity measure,” in Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR), 2011 IEEE
Conference on, IEEE, 233–240.
Lee, I. H. (1993): “On the convergence of informational cascades,” Journal of Economic
Theory, 61, 395–411.
Levy, G. and R. Razin (2018): “Information diffusion in networks with the Bayesian Peer
Influence heuristic,” Games and Economic Behavior.
Lobel, I. and E. Sadler (2015): “Information diffusion in networks through social learn-
ing,” Theoretical Economics, 10, 807–851.
McPherson, M., L. Smith-Lovin, and J. M. Cook (2001): “Birds of a feather: Ho-
mophily in social networks,” Annual Review of Sociology, 27, 415–444.
Mobius, M., T. Phan, and A. Szeidl (2015): “Treasure hunt: Social learning in the
field,” Mimeo.
Molavi, P., A. Tahbaz-Salehi, and A. Jadbabaie (2018): “A Theory of Non-Bayesian
Social Learning,” Econometrica, 86, 445–490.
Mueller-Frank, M. and C. Neri (2015): “A general model of boundedly rational ob-
servational learning: Theory and evidence,” Mimeo.
Sadler, E. (2017): “Innovation adoption and collective experimentation,” .
31
Sethi, R. and M. Yildiz (2012): “Public disagreement,” American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics, 4, 57–95.
Smith, L. and P. Sørensen (2000): “Pathological outcomes of observational learning,”
Econometrica, 68, 371–398.
Weizsäcker, G. (2010): “Do we follow others when we should? A simple test of rational
expectations,” American Economic Review, 100, 2340–2360.
32
Appendix
A Further Comparative Statics
Proofs of results in this section appear in the Online Appendix.
A.1 Constant Out-Degree
In Section 4.2, we considered a network where the number of predecessors observed by an
agent grows linearly in the agent’s position in the line. This assumption implies there are
late movers who observe arbitrarily many predecessors, which may be unrealistic in some
settings. Here we consider an alternate network where all agents have the same number of
observations – that is to say, all agents have the same out-degree in the network – and show
that a result similar to Proposition 3 still holds.
Suppose there is some positive integer d such that agent n puts weight d/(n− 1) on each
predecessor. This ensures each agent has an out-degree of d in the observation network M .
In the analogous random network, this corresponds to each agent having d neighbors on
average. (If d is large, then our network has some early agents assigning weight greater than
1 to each of their predecessors. This simplifies proofs, but it is not necessary.)
Proposition A.1. Society learns correctly in the long-run if and only if d = 1. If d > 1,
then actions an converge to 0 or 1 a.s., and the probability of mislearning is increasing in d.
The intuition that a denser observation network leads to more mislearning for naifs carries
over from Proposition 3.
Our Proposition 2 is related to Proposition 4 of Eyster and Rabin (2014), which provides
a set of sufficient conditions under which agents mislearn with positive probability. Their
result applies to a more general class of learning environments and learning rules. When
specialized to our network learning setting, the “redundancy neglect” condition of Eyster
and Rabin (2014)’s Proposition 4 applies if and only if there exist c > 0 and N ∈ N such
that ∑t−1j=t−N Mt,j > (1 + c) for every t ≥ N + 1. This means their sufficient condition does
not apply to some network structures such as Mi,j = di−1 for j < i, which spreads d weight
equally on all predecessors for each agent. But as we have seen in Proposition A.1, when
d > 1 we have limn→∞ I(1→ n) 6= 0 and there is a positive chance of mislearning, with this
chance increasing in d.
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A.2 Decaying Weights
In the example networks we studied in Section 4, the weight placed on the link between
agents i and j did not depend on the distance between them. In many settings, agents
place more weight on recent predecessors than on predecessors who moved long before. For
example, recency is often a criterion in deciding which online reviews to display. In other
settings, individuals may place less trust in those who are farther away in some sense.
To model these dynamics, we consider networks where network weights decay exponen-
tially in distance. When the rate of decay is above a threshold, the results of Sections 4.2
and 4.3 still apply. When the rate of decay is below the threshold, agents’ beliefs do not
converge. At the threshold value, society learns correctly.
We begin with a network where weights depend only on distance. Let δ > 0 and suppose
each link from an agent i to a predecessor j has weight Mi,j = δi−j.
Proposition A.2. If δ < 12 , then almost surely actions an do not converge. If δ ≥ 12 , beliefs
converge almost surely to 0 or 1. Society learns correctly when δ = 12 , while the probability
of mislearning is non-zero and increasing in δ when δ > 12 .
The case of δ > 12 turns out to have the same recurrence relation as the uniform p weight
network for some suitable p. When δ = 12 , private signals of all predecessors are given equal
weight, so law of large numbers implies correct learning. To see the a.s. non-convergence
result for δ < 12 , we show that there is a uniform bound on the mean and variance of a˜n for all
n, hence a˜n → ∞ cannot happen with positive probability. A similar argument shows that
a˜n → −∞ is also a zero-probability event. At the same time, a˜n+1 − a˜n has non-negligible
variance, so we also cannot have a˜n → c for some real number c.
The main takeaway is that our intuitions about link density extend to this setting where
weights depend on distance and degree is bounded. There is also a new phenomenon, given
by a threshold decay rate that divides networks where convergence does not occur and those
where beliefs converge but can be wrong.
At the threshold δ = 12 , the out-degree of agents approaches one asymptotically. Beliefs
converge when agents make more than one direct observation but need not converge with
less than one direct observation. Society only learns correctly at the threshold value, which
highlights the fragility of learning in our model.
Our results with two groups also extend to networks where weights decay with distance.
As in Section 4.3, consider a network with odd-numbered agents in one groups and even-
numbered agents in another group. The link from a later agent i to an earlier agent j has
weight δi−jqs if i and j are in the same group (i ∼= j mod 2) and weight δi−jqd if i and j are
in different groups (i ∼= j + 1 mod 2).
34
Proposition A.3. For each qs and qd, there exists a threshold δ0(qs, qd) such that (i) with
probability one, actions do not converge when δ < δ0(qs, qd); (ii) society learns correctly when
δ = δ0(qs, qd); (iii) beliefs converge a.s. to 0 or 1 when δ ≥ δ0(qs, qd). In the region where
δ > δ0(qs, qd), the probability of mislearning is non-zero and increasing in δ, qs and qd but
increasing qd has a larger effect than increasing qs.
This Proposition, which extends Propositions 4 and A.2, demonstrates the robustness of
each of the two previous results.
A.3 Naive and Autarkic Agents
Suppose that for some integers n1 ≥ 1 and n2 ≥ 1, agents alternate between n1 naive agents
and n2 autarkic agents repeatedly. An autarkic agent ignores her social observations and
chooses the action optimal given her private signal. We consider networks as in Section 4.2,
so that each link has weight Mi,j = q. The comparative static from Proposition 3 still holds
for autarkic agents.
Proposition A.4. When q ∈ (0, 1], naive agents’ actions an converge to 0 or 1 a.s. The
probability of naive agents mislearning is increasing in q.
If a fraction of agents are autarkic, the remaining agents will still agree. Moreover,
these agents will be more likely to be correct on sparser networks. The result is intended
as an example of a related behavioral model where redundancy neglect leads to the same
comparative static.
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B Omitted Proofs from the Main Text
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Due to naiveté, i thinks neighbor j must have received signal sj such that s˜j = a˜j.
The log-likelihood ratio of state ω = 1 and state ω = 0 conditional on some signal realizations
is:
ln
(
P[ω = 1|si, (sj)j∈Ni ]
P[ω = 0|si, (sj)j∈Ni ]
)
= ln
(
P[si, (sj)j∈Ni |ω = 1]
P[si, (sj)j∈Ni |ω = 0]
)
(two states equally likely)
= ln
P[si|ω = 1]
P[si|ω = 0] ·
∏
j∈Ni
P[sj|ω = 1]
P[sj|ω = 0]
 (by independence)
= ln
(
P[ω = 1|si]
P[ω = 0|si]
)
+
∑
j∈Ni
ln
(
P[ω = 1|sj]
P[ω = 0|sj]
)
= s˜i +
∑
j∈Ni
s˜j.
A naive agent i chooses an action with a˜i equal to the log-likelihood ratio of state ω = 1
and state ω = 0 given private signal si and neighbors’ signals such that s˜j = a˜j, which is
s˜i +
∑
j∈Ni a˜j.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. We check the formula for each of the two interpretations. For the noisy observation
interpretation, i observes a˜j + i,j for each neighbor j and believes that s˜j = a˜j. By Assump-
tion 2 and Lemma 3 (which is proven independently), s˜j is distributed as N ( 2σ2 , 4σ2 ) when
ω = 1, so that i believes their observation has distribution N ( 2
σ2 ,
1
Mi,j
· 4
σ2 ) when ω = 1 and
N (− 2
σ2 ,
1
Mi,j
· 4
σ2 ) when ω = −1. So agent i believes that σ
2
2 (a˜j + i,j) ∼ N (±1, σ
2
Mi,j
), depend-
ing on the state. Applying Lemma 3 again, we find that i then believes the log-likelihood
ratio of ω = 1 and ω = 0 is Mi,j(a˜j + i,j). In the case when observations are correct, this
simplifies to Mi,j a˜j. The proof now proceeds as in the proof of Lemma 1.
We next show the lemma holds under the generations interpretation. By the law of
large numbers a fraction Mi,j of the agents in generation i observe an agent in generation
j, and the average observed log-action among this group is equal to a˜j. The result follows
from computing each member of generation i’s action as in the proof of Lemma 1 and then
averaging.
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B.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. By Lemma 2, for each i we have a˜i = s˜i +
∑
j∈NiMi,j a˜j. In vector notation, we
therefore have: 
a˜1
...
a˜n
 =

s˜1
...
s˜n
+M ·

a˜1
...
a˜n

Algebra then yields the desired expression. Note that (I −M) is invertible because M is
lower triangular with all diagonal entries equal to zero.
To see the path-counting interpretation, write (I − M)−1 = ∑∞k=0Mk. Here, (Mk)i,j
counts the number of weighted paths of length k from i to j.
B.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. The log-likelihood ratio is
ln
(
P[ω = 1|si]
P[ω = 0|si]
)
= ln
(
P[si|ω = 1]
P[si|ω = 0]
)
= ln
exp
(−(si−1)2
2σ2
)
exp
(−(si+1)2
2σ2
)

= −(s
2
i − 2si + 1) + (s2i + 2si + 1)
2σ2 = 2si/σ
2.
B.5 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. By Proposition 1, a˜n =
∑n
i=1 bn,is˜i. This is equal to
∑n
i=1
2bn,i
σ2 si according to Lemma
3. Conditional on ω = 1, (si) are i.i.d. N (1, σ2) random variables, so
n∑
i=1
2bn,i
σ2
si ∼ N
(
2
σ2
n∑
i=1
bn,i,
4
σ2
n∑
i=1
b2n,i
)
= N
( 2
σ2
‖~bn‖1, 4
σ2
‖~bn‖22
)
.
B.6 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. By Lemma 4, a˜n|(ω = 1) ∼ N
(
2
σ2‖~bn‖1, 4σ2‖~bn‖22
)
. So using property of the Gaussian
distribution,
P[a˜n < 0|ω = 1] = Φ
− 2σ2‖~bn‖12
σ
‖~bn‖2
 = Φ
− 1
σ
· ‖
~bn‖1
‖~bn‖2
 .
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B.7 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume ω = 1. (The case of ω = 0 is exactly analogous
and will be omitted.) Note that an converges in probability to 1 if and only if a˜n converges
in probability to ∞.
First suppose that limn→∞ I(j → n) 6= 0 for some j. Then there exists  > 0 such that
I(j → n) >  for infinitely many n. For each such n, the probability that agent n chooses
an action with a˜n < 0 is equal to the probability that
∑n
i=1 I(i→ n)s˜i is negative.
Because s˜ has finite variance, we can find positive constants C and δ independent of n
such that∑i 6=j I(i→ n)s˜i < C with probability at least δ (for example, by applying Markov’s
inequality to |s˜i|). Then agent n will be wrong if s˜j < −C/, which is a positive probability
event since s˜ is unbounded. So the probability that an agent n such that I(j → n) > 
chooses a˜n < 0 is bounded from below by a positive constant.
For the converse, suppose that limn→∞ I(i → n) = 0 for all i. By the independence
of the log signals s˜i, the log-action a˜n =
∑n
i=1 I(i → n)s˜i is a random variable with mean
‖~bn‖1E[s˜1|ω = 1] and standard deviation ‖~bn‖2Std[s˜1|ω = 1]. We now use the connectedness
assumption to show that ‖~bn‖1‖~bn‖2 →∞.
Find N and C ≤ 1 as in the connectedness assumption. For each  > 0, we can chooseM
such that I(i→ n) <  whenever i < N and n > M by the hypothesis limn→∞ I(i→ n) = 0
applied to the finitely many members i < N . But now for any j ≥ N and any n >
max(j,M), concatenating a path from j to n with a path from i to j gives a path from i to
n whose weight is the product of the weights of the two subpaths. This shows bn,i ≥ bj,i · bn,j,
which implies I(i → n) ≥ I(j → n) · bj,i. we have I(j → n) ≤ mini<N I(i → n)/bj,i, where
bj,i ≥ C for at least one i < N by the connectedness assumption. This shows for any j ∈ N
and for n > M, we get I(j → n) ≤ /C.
We have for all n > M,
‖~bn‖2
‖~bn‖1
≤ max
j
√
‖~bn‖1 · bn,j
‖~bn‖1
= max
j<n
√
I(j → n) <
√
/C.
Because  > 0 is arbitrary, ‖~bn‖1‖~bn‖2 converges to infinity.
Let some K > 0 be given. We now show that P[a˜n < K|ω = 1]→ 0, hence proving that
a˜n converges to ∞ in probability. We compute
zn :=
E[a˜n|ω = 1]−K
Std[a˜n|ω = 1] =
‖~bn‖1 · E[s˜1|ω = 1]
‖~bn‖2·Std[s˜1|ω = 1]
− K‖~bn‖2 · Std[s˜1|ω = 1]
.
Since we assumed the signal structure is non-trivial, E[s˜1|ω = 1] > 0. Together with
‖~bn‖1
‖~bn‖2 →∞, this shows the first term converges to infinity. By the connectedness assumption,
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‖~bn‖2 ≥ C for all large enough n, so the second term is bounded. This implies zn →∞. By
Chebyshev’s inequality, P[a˜n < K|ω = 1] ≤ 1z2n . This shows P[a˜n < K|ω = 1]→ 0.
B.8 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The numbers of paths from various agents to agent i satisfy the recurrence relation
bn,i = (1 + q)bn−1,i when n− i > 1. By a simple computation, we find that
a˜n =
n−1∑
i=1
q(1 + q)n−i−1s˜i + s˜n.
Since s˜i are independent Gaussian random variables, our argument uses the fact that for n
large, a˜n has the same sign as another Gaussian random variable, whose mean and variance
we can compute.
We first show that a˜n converges to −∞ or∞ almost surely. Consider the random variable
Xn(~s) :=
1
2
n−1∑
i=1
(1 + q)−is˜i,
where ~s := (si)∞i=1 is the profile of private signal realizations. By a standard result, Xn(~s)
converges almost surely to a random variable Y (~s) such that the conditional distribution of
Y in each state of the world is Gaussian. For each n, a˜n(~s) = 2q(1+ q)n−1 ·Xn(~s)+ s˜n. Since∑∞
n=1 P[s˜n > n] <∞, by the Borel–Cantelli lemma P[s˜n > n infinitely often] = 0. So almost
surely, limn→∞ a˜n(~s) = limn→∞ 2q(1 + q)n−1 ·Y (~s) + s˜n ∈ {−∞,∞}. This in turn shows that
an converges to 0 or 1 almost surely.
Now we show P[an → 0|ω = 1] = Φ
(
−
√
q+2
q
)
, which is the same probability as P[a˜n →
−∞|ω = 1]. The random variable Y (~s) that Xn(~s) converges to a.s. has the distribution
N (1
q
, 1
q(q+2)) when ω = 1, and a˜n has the same sign as Xn(~s) with probability converging to 1
for n large. The distribution N (1
q
, 1
q(q+2)) assigns 1−Φ
(
−
√
q+2
q
)
probability to the positive
region. The symmetric argument holds for ω = 0.
B.9 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Suppose we have two groups, and agents observe predecessors in the same group with
weight qs and predecessors in the other group with weight qd. Then the coefficients bn,i
satisfy the recurrence relation
bn,i = qdbn−1,i + (1 + qs)bn−2,i
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when n− i > 2. Since the network is translation invariant, bn,i only depends on n− i. By a
standard algebraic fact, there exist constants c+, c−, ξ+, ξ− so that
bn,i = c+ξn−i+ + c−ξn−i− ,
where ξ± are the solutions to the polynomial x2− qdx− (1 + qs) = 0 and c+, c− are constants
that we can determine from b2,1 and b3,1. We compute
ξ± =
qd ±
√
4qs + qd + 4
2 ,
where ξ+ > 1 and ξ− < 0. By arguments analogous to those in the proof of Proposition
3, we may again establish that an converges to 0 or 1 almost surely. We now analyze the
probability of mislearning.
Since ξ+ > |ξ−|, the exponential term with base ξ+ dominates as n grows large. This
shows c+ > 0, since bn,i counts number of weighted paths in a network so must be a positive
number. This also shows that P[a˜n < 0|ω = 1] → P[∑∞i=0(ξ+)−is˜i < 0|ω = 1] as n → ∞.
Conditional on ω = 1, the sum ∑∞i=0(ξ+)−is˜i has the distribution N ( 2ξ+−1 , 4(ξ+−1)(ξ++1)), so it
is easy to show the probability assigned to the negative region is increasing in ξ+.
Having shown the probability of mislearning is monotonically increasing in ξ+, we can
take comparative statics:
∂ξ+
∂qd
= qd2
√
4qs + qd + 4
+ 12 and
∂ξ+
∂qs
= 1√4qs + qd + 4 .
It is easy to see that ∂ξ+
∂qd
> ∂ξ+
∂qs
> 0 for all qs ≥ 0 and qd > 0.
B.10 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. We will prove a more general statement where disagreement happens if the signal
structure satisfies the following three assumptions:
No Uninformative Signals: Signals s for which P[ω = 1|s] = P[ω = 0|s] have 0 probability.
So, we may decompose (up to a P-null set) S = S+ ∪ S− where
S+ := {s ∈ S : P[ω = 1|s] > P[ω = 0|s]}
S− := {s ∈ S : P[ω = 1|s] < P[ω = 0|s]}.
Symmetry:
P[ω = 1|s ∈ S+]
P[ω = 0|s ∈ S+] =
P[ω = 0|s ∈ S−]
P[ω = 1|s ∈ S−] .
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Thin Tails: ∞∑
n=0
P
[
s ∈ S : ln
(
P[ω = 1|s]
P[ω = 0|s]
)
> n|ω = 1
]
<∞ and
∞∑
n=0
P
[
s ∈ S : ln
(
P[ω = 1|s]
P[ω = 0|s]
)
< −n|ω = 1
]
<∞.
No Uninformative Signals is for convenience and rules out tie-breaking problems. Thin
Tails says when the state is ω = 1, extremely informative signals in favor of either state
are not too common. This assumption is automatically satisfied if the signal structure is
boundedly informative, such as in the case of binary signal structure from Assumption 5.
The Gaussian signal structure from Assumption 2 satisfies No Uninformative Signals and
Symmetry, with S+ = R>0 and S− = R<0. For Thin Tails, ln
(
P[ω=1|s]
P[ω=0|s]
)
= 2s/σ2 under the
Gaussian assumption, so we are looking at the sum
∞∑
n=0
P[2N (1, σ2)/σ2 > n].
This is convergent because it is known that the Gaussian distribution function tends to
0 faster than geometrically. Similarly we also have ∑∞n=0 P[2N (1, σ2)/σ2 < −n] <∞.
So it suffices to show the Theorem under assumptions No Uninformative Signals, Sym-
metry and Thin Tails. We make use of the following concentration inequality from Hoeffding
(1963):
Fact 1. (Hoeffding) Suppose X1, ..., Xn are independent random variables on R such that
ai ≤ Xi ≤ bi with probability 1 for each i. Write Sn := ∑ni=1Xi . We have
P [Sn − E[Sn] ≤ −t] ≤ exp(−2t2/
n∑
i=1
(bi − ai)2).
Define κ to be a naive agent’s log-likelihood ratio of state ω = 1 versus state ω = 0 upon
observing one neighbor who picks action 1. Then we have:
κ := ln
(
P[ω = 1|s ∈ S+]
P[ω = 0|s ∈ S+]
)
> 0.
By Symmetry, the log-likelihood ratio after observing one neighbor who chooses action 0
is −κ.
Suppose after 2n agents have moved, the actions taken so far involve every odd-numbered
agent playing 1, every even-numbered agent playing 0. Write Bn,qs ∼ Binom(n, qs) for the
number of agents that 2n + 1 observes from her own group, and Bn,qd ∼ Binom(n, qd) is
the number of agents 2n + 1 observes from the other group. By Hoeffding’s inequality, the
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probability that Bn,qs −Bn,qd falls below half of its expected value n(qs − qd) is:
(1)n := P
[
(Bn,qs −Bn,qd)− n(qs − qd) ≤ −
1
2n(qs − qd)
]
≤ exp(−12n
2(qs − qd)2/(2n)).
But in the event that Bn,qs −Bn,qd ≥ 12n(qs− qd), 2n+ 1 has a log-likelihood ratio of at least
1
2n(qs−qd)κ from observations alone. The probability that private signal s2n+1 is so strongly
in favor of ω = 0 as to make 2n+ 1 play 0 is:
(2)n := P
[
s ∈ S : ln
(
P[ω = 1|s]
P[ω = 0|s]
)
<
1
2n(qs − qd)κ|ω = 1
]
We have ∑∞n=1 (1)n < ∞ because (1)n ∼ exp(−n), while ∑∞n=1 (2)n < ∞ due to Thin Tails
assumptions. This shows that there is positive probability that every odd-numbered agent
plays 1.
By Symmetry, an analogous argument establishes that there is also positive probability
that every even-numbered agent plays 0.
B.11 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Let −κ be a naive agent’s log-likelihood ratio of state ω = 1 versus state ω = 0 upon
observing an even-numbered predecessor play the action 0. Then we have:
−κ := ln
(
P[ω = 1|s < 0]
P[ω = 0|s < 0]
)
< 0.
Write O for the event where the odd-numbered agents converge to playing 1. Write E for the
event where the even-numbered agents converge to playing 1. We will prove that P[E|O] = 1.
(The other case of odd-numbered agents converging to playing 0 is symmetric and omitted.)
Below, we will partition O into countably many subevents, OM,N for M,N ∈ {0, 1, ..., }.
We will construct for each (M,N) a P-null event HM,N such that OM,N ∩HcM,N ⊆ E. This
implies P[OM,N∩E] = P[OM,N ] for every (M,N), so by countable additivity P[O∩E] = P[O].
To begin this partitioning, pick  > 0 small enough such that
− 2κqs + 112qda˜
1− > 0, (1)
where a˜1− is the log odds associated with the action 1− .
Now, let OM,N ⊆ O be the event where:
1. (a2n+1) converge to 1;
2.
⌊∑
{n:a˜2n+1<0} a˜2n+1
⌋
= −M ;
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3. N = min{n : infj≥n a2j+1 ≥ 1− }.
That is, the (floor of) sum of negative log-actions in (a˜2n+1) equals to −M , while all actions
are above 1 −  starting from player 2N + 1. To see that (OM,N) partition O, observe that
every convergent sequence a2n+1 → 1 satisfies (2) and (3) for some M and N , because only
finitely many terms can have a˜2n+1 < 0 and also we must have a2n+1 ≥ 1 −  for all large
enough n.
We now proceed to construct the P-null event HM,N . We will do this through a sequence
of triplets of events (F n1 , F n2 , F n3 ) with
∑∞
n=1 P[F n1 ∪ F n2 ∪ F n3 ] <∞ and put
HM,N := {(F n1 ∪ F n2 ∪ F n3 ) infinitely often},
so that P[HM,N ] = 0 by the Borel–Cantelli lemma.
We start by defining F n1 . Let Bn,qs be the number of even-numbered predecessors that
agent 2n observes, so Bn,qs ∼ Binom(n − 1, qs). Define F n1 as the event Bn,qs > 2nqs.
Straightforward application of Hoeffding’s inequality as in the proof of Theorem 2 shows
that P[F n1 ] ≤ exp(−2nqs). It is clear that
∑
n P[F n1 ] <∞.
Then, we define F n2 . Let B(N)n,qd be the number of odd-numbered predecessors in positions
2N + 1 or later that agent 2n observes, so B(N)n,qd ∼ Binom((n − N) ∧ 0, qd). Define F n2 as
the event B(N)n,qd <
1
4nqd. For n > 2N , we have E[B
(N)
n,qd
] = (n − N)qd ≥ 12nqd, so applying
Hoeffding’s inequality gives
P[F n2 ] ≤ exp(−2 · (
1
4nqd)
2/(n−N)) ≤ exp(−2 · (14nqd)
2/n) = exp(−18nqd).
So when n > 2N , P[F n2 ] decreases to 0 exponentially, meaning
∑
n P[F n2 ] <∞.
Next, we define F n3 . Intuitively, this is the event that agent 2n gets a “strong enough”
private signal to overturn her observations. Specifically, F n3 is the event
s˜2n +
1
12nqd · a˜
1− ≤ 0,
where a˜1− was defined in Equation (1). Since ln
(
P[ω=1|s]
P[ω=0|s]
)
= 2s/σ2 under the Gaussian as-
sumption, P[F n3 ] = P[2N (1, σ2)/σ2 < − 112nqd · a˜1−]. But the Gaussian distribution function
tends to 0 faster than geometrically, so ∑n P[F n3 ] <∞ as well.
Finally, we need to argue that the even-numbered agents always converge to playing 1
on the event OM,N ∩HcM,N . On the event HcM,N , there exists G1 ∈ N so that n ≥ G1 implies
player 2n gets no more than 2nqs observations from her own group, no fewer than 14nqd
observations from the odd-numbered predecessors past position 2N + 1, and gets a private
signal s2n with s˜2n + 112nqd · a˜1− > 0. Find also G2 ∈ N so that 112G2qda˜1− > M . We show
that a2n = 1 for every n ≥ max(G1, G2).
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Agent 2n observes three kinds of predecessors: even-numbered predecessors, odd-numbered
predecessors earlier than position 2N+1, and odd-numbered predecessors later than position
2N + 1. The no more than 2nqs observations of the first kind contribute in the worst case a
log odds of −κ · (2nqs). Observations of the second kind, on the event OM,N , contribute a
worst-case log odds of −M . Observations of the third kind, which number at least 14nqd on
the event HcM,N , contribute at least a log odds of 14nqd · a˜1− on the event OM,N . So 2n’s log
odds is at least:
n · (−2κqs + 112qda˜
1−) + (−M + 112nqda˜
1−) + (s˜2n +
1
12nqda˜
1−)
The first summand is positive by choice of  in Equation (1). The second summand is positive
since n ≥ G2. And the third summand is positive since n ≥ G1.
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C Theoretical Predictions in the Experimental Envi-
ronment
C.1 Bounding the Performance of Rational Agents
Consider 40 rational agents on a random network where each agent is linked to each of her
predecessors 34 of the time, i.i.d. across link realizations. Agents know their own neighbors
but have no further knowledge about the realization of random network. The signal structure
and payoff structure match the experimental design in Section 6.2.
We provide a lower bound for the accuracy of agents 33 through 40. We first show
that when every player uses the rational strategy, all agents learn at least as well as when
everyone uses any constrained strategy that only depends on their signal and their final social
observation. We then exhibit payoffs under one such strategy, which give a lower bound on
rational performance.
Fix an arbitrary sequence of constrained strategies (σi) where σi : Si × {0, 1, ∅} →
∆({0, 1}) is only a function of i’s signal si and the action of the most recent predecessor that
i observes (σi(si, ∅) refers to i’s play if i does not observe any predecessor). Let ai denote i’s
action induced by this sequence of strategies. Let a′i denote i’s action when all agents use
the rational strategy.
Claim 1. For all i, P[a′i = ω]≥ P[ai = ω].
Proof. The proof is by induction on i and the base case of i = 1 is clear. Suppose the claim
holds for i = 1, ..., n. Conditional on agent n+ 1 observing no predecessors, the claim again
holds as in the base case, so we can check the claim conditional on Nn+1 non-empty.
Let j be the final agent in Nn+1. Then the rational agent observes sn+1, a′j for some
j ≤ n, and perhaps some other actions while the constrained agent observes sn+1 and aj,
where P[a′j = ω]≥ P[aj = ω] by the inductive hypothesis. By garbling the observed action
a′j, the rational agent could construct a random variable with the same joint distribution
with ω as the less accurate action aj. Ignoring other observed actions, the rational agent
n + 1 could therefore follow a strategy that does as well as agent n + 1 under the strategy
profile (σi). So we must have P[a′n+1 = ω]≥ P[an+1 = ω] when everyone uses the rational
strategy.
We then numerically compute the values for P[a
i
= ω] under the optimal constrained
strategy, which are displayed in Table 2.
agent number
probability correct
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
0.9685 0.9695 0.9705 0.9714 0.9723 0.9731 0.9739 0.9746
Table 2: Lower bounds on rational performance.
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C.2 Performance of Naive Agents
Consider 40 naive agents on a random network where each agent is linked to each of her
predecessors with probability p, i.i.d. across link realizations. The signal structure and
payoff structure match the experimental design in Section 6.2.
We will compute the accuracy of each agent by a recursive calculation. Because naive
agents’ actions do not depend on the order of predecessors, behavior depends only on the
number of agents who have played L and the number of agents who have played R as well
as the network. We will compute the distribution over the number of agents from the first
n who have played L and the number who have played R recursively.
Assume the state is R. Let P (k, k′) be the probability that k of the first n agents play L
and k′ of the first n agents play R. We define P (k, k′) = 0 if k < 0 or k′ < 0. The posterior
log-likelihood of state R for a naive agent observing one action equal to R (and no signal) is
` = 2
σ2
· µ+ σφ(−µ/σ)1− Φ(−µ/σ) ,
where Φ and φ are the distribution function and probability density function of a standard
Gaussian random variable, respectively.
Then we have the recursive relation
P (k, k′) = P (k − 1, k′)∑i≤k−1,i′≤k′ B(i, k − 1, q)B(i′, k′, q)Φ(σ(i−i′)`−2µσ2 ) +
P (k, k′ − 1)∑i≤k,i′≤k′−1B(i, k, q)B(i′, k′ − 1, q)[1− Φ(σ(i−i′)`−2µσ2 )],
where B(i, k, q) is the probability a binomial distribution with parameters k and p is equal
to i. The first summand corresponds to the possibility of agent k+ k′ choosing L after k− 1
predecessors choose L and the remainder choose R, and the second summand corresponds to
the probability of agent k + k′ choosing R after k predecessors choose L and the remainder
choose R. The binomial coefficients correspond to the possible network realizations. Here
we use naiveté, which implies that only the number of observed agents choosing each action
matters for behavior and not their order.
From these distributions P (·, ·) we can compute the probability that agent n chooses the
correct action R:
n∑
k=0
P (k, n− k) ∑
i≤k,i′≤n−k
B(i, k, q)B(i′, n− k, q)[1− Φ(σ(i− i
′)`− 2µσ
2 )].
These probabilities, which we compute numerically, are displayed in Table 3 for agents 33
through 40.
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agent number
accuracy with q = 1/4
accuracy with q = 3/4
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
0.8773 0.8780 0.8786 0.8792 0.8797 0.8801 0.8805 0.8808
0.7768 0.7768 0.7768 0.7768 0.7768 0.7768 0.7768 0.7768
Table 3: Naive performance.
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D Relegated Figures and Tables
Distribution of overall accuracy for trials on sparse networks (p = 0.25)
fraction of subjects correctly guessing the state
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Distribution of overall accuracy for trials on dense networks (p = 0.75)
fraction of subjects correctly guessing the state
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Figure 4: Histograms of fractions of agents correctly guessing the state
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Dependent variable:
FractionCorrect
MisleadingEarlySignals 0.014
(0.017)
NetworkDensity 0.033
(0.082)
MisleadingEarlySignals×NetworkDensity −0.050∗
(0.030)
Constant 0.768∗∗∗
(0.045)
Observations 260
R2 0.040
Adjusted R2 0.029
Residual Std. Error 0.163 (df = 256)
F Statistic 3.566∗∗ (df = 3; 256)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 4: Effect of misleading early signals.
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Online Appendix
OA 1 Proofs of Results in Appendix A
OA 1.1 Proof of Proposition A.1
Proof. We have the recurrence relation bn,i = dn−1 ·bn−1,i+ n−2n−1 ·bn−1,i when n− i > 1. Solving
this recurrence relation,
bn,i =
d
i
n−i∏
j=2
n− j + d
n− j + 1 .
When n− i > d, these coefficients are equal to
bn,i =
d
n− 1 ·
(n+ d− 2) · (n+ d− 3) · ... · (n− 1)
(i+ d− 1) · (i+ d− 2) · ... · i .
This product approaches dnd−1
id
asymptotically. So for large n,
‖~bn‖1
‖~bn‖2
≈
∑n
i=1(nd−1/id)
[∑ni=1(n2d−2/i2d)]1/2 =
∑n
i=1 i
−d
(∑ni=1 i−2d)1/2 .
If d = 1, the numerator diverges and the denominator converges. This argument shows
limn→∞ ‖
~bn‖1
‖~bn‖2 = ∞. By the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 4, this means society
learns correctly in the long-run.
If d > 1, then from the formula for bn,i, when n − i > d we may factor bn,i into a
term depending only on i and another term depending only on n, bn,i = ψ(i) · φ(n) with
ψ(i) := 1(i+d−1)·(i+d−2)·...·i and φ(n) :=
d·(n+d−2)·(n+d−3)·...·(n−1)
n−1 , when n − i > d. Consider
the random variables Xn(~s) :=
∑
i<n ψ(i)s˜i and Y (~s) :=
∑∞
i=1 ψ(i)s˜i. Because
∑∞
i=1 ψ(i)
converges, Xn converges almost surely to Y and Y has a Gaussian distribution. Also since
a˜n(~s) = φ(n) ·Xn(~s) + s˜n and limn→∞ φ(n) = ∞, by the same argument as in the proof of
Proposition 3, we know an converges to 0 or 1 almost surely.
We now show the probability of mislearning is increasing in d (for d an integer). We have
P[an → 0|ω = 1] = P[Y < 0|ω = 1] = P
[
Y
ψ(1) < 0|ω = 1
]
.
Since ψ(i+ 1)/ψ(i) = i
i+d , we get E
[
Y
ψ(1) < 0|ω = 1
]
=‖ ~v ‖1 ·E[s˜1|ω = 1] and
Var
[
Y
ψ(1) < 0|ω = 1
]
=‖ ~v ‖22 ·Var[s˜1|ω = 1],
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where
~v := (1, 2
d+ 2 ,
2
d+ 2 ·
3
d+ 3 , · · · ,
2
d+ 2 ·
3
d+ 3 · ... ·
i
d+ i , · · · ).
The probability P
[
Y
ψ(1) < 0|ω = 1
]
is decreasing in ‖ ~v ‖1 / ‖ ~v ‖2 and we claim that
‖ ~v ‖1 / ‖ ~v ‖2 is decreasing in d. This is a consequence of Lemma OA.1.
Lemma OA.1. Let ~a = (a1, a2, ...) be a square-summable vector with strictly positive, strictly
decreasing entries. For 0 ≤ c < 1 and i ∈ N, let the new vector ~a′ = (a1, a2, · · · , ai−1, cai, cai+1, · · · )
have entries equal to aj for j < i and caj for j ≥ i. Then
‖ ~a′ ‖1
‖ ~a′ ‖2
<
‖ ~a ‖1
‖ ~a ‖2 .
Proof. For each c ∈ [0, 1), let ~a′(c) := (a1, a2, · · · , ai−1, cai, cai+1, · · · ) It is sufficient to check
that
∂
∂c
‖ ~a′(c) ‖21
‖ ~a′(c) ‖22
> 0
at every c ∈ [0, 1).
We compute
∂
∂c
‖ ~a′(c) ‖21
‖ ~a′(c) ‖22
= ∂
∂c
(∑i−1j=1 aj +∑∞j=i caj)2∑i−1
j=1 a
2
j +
∑∞
j=i c
2a2j
.
Differentiating gives a fraction with a positive denominator and a numerator of:
2
∞∑
j=i
aj(
i−1∑
j=1
a2j + c2
∞∑
j=i
a2j)(
i−1∑
j=1
aj + c
∞∑
j=i
aj)− 2c
∞∑
j=i
a2j(
i−1∑
j=1
aj + c
∞∑
j=i
aj)2.
This expression has the same sign as
∞∑
j=i
aj(
i−1∑
j=1
a2j + c2
∞∑
j=i
a2j)− c
∞∑
j=i
a2j(
i−1∑
j=1
aj + c
∞∑
j=i
aj) =
i−1∑
j=1
a2j
∞∑
j=i
aj − c
i−1∑
j=1
aj
∞∑
j=i
a2j
=
i−1∑
j=1
∞∑
k=i
ajak(aj − cak)
> 0
because aj > ak for all j < k and c < 1.
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OA 1.2 Proof of Proposition A.2
Proof. The coefficients bi,n satisfy the recurrence relation bn,i = 2δbn−1,i whenever n− i > 1.
Recall that the recurrence relation in the uniform p weight network is bn,i = (1 + q)bn−1,i.
When δ > 12 , the coefficients bn,i for the δ decay network is the same as the coefficients in the
uniform p weight network with q = 2δ−1 > 0. By Proposition 3, an converges almost surely
to 0 or 1, with positive probability of mislearning. Furthermore, as δ 7→ 2δ− 1 is increasing,
again by Proposition 3 we see the probability of mislearning is increasing in δ for δ > 12 .
When δ = 12 , all predecessors’ signals are given equal weight, so by the law of large
numbers actions converge to ω almost surely.
The final case is δ < 12 . We show almost surely the sequence an does not converge,
conditional on ω = 1. From the recurrence relation for the coefficients bn,i, it is easy to check
that a˜n = 2δa˜n−1 + s˜n − δs˜n−1 for each n.
Evidently bi+1,i = δ, so from recursion bn,i = (2δ)n−i−1δ for i ≤ n − 1, bn,n = 1. So,
a˜n = s˜n + δ
∑n−2
j=0 (2δ)j · s˜n−1−j, meaning a˜n ∼ N (1 + δ 1−(2δ)
n−1
1−2δ , 1 + δ
2 1−(4δ2)n−1
1−4δ2 ), with a
limiting distribution of N (1 + δ1−2δ , 1 + δ
2
1−4δ2 ) when ω = 1.
Let the probability space be R∞, the space of all sequences of private signal realizations,
with typical member ~s = (si)i∈N.
Assume by way of contradiction that a˜n diverges to ∞ with positive probability 2 > 0.
We can find a large enough K so that N (1 + δ1−2δ , 1 + δ
2
1−4δ2 ) > K has probability less
than . Since the mean and variance of a˜n are both increasing in n, this says P[a˜n > K|ω =
1] ≤ P
[
N (1 + δ1−2δ , 1 + δ
2
1−4δ2 ) > K
]
<  for every n. Writing En ⊆ R∞ for those signal
realizations ~s where a˜n(~s) > K, we get P[En|ω = 1] <  for every n.
But since we assumed a˜n diverges to ∞ with probability 2, this means there is an event
F∗ ⊆ R∞, where P[F∗|ω = 1] = 2 and limn→∞ a˜n(~s) = ∞ for every ~s ∈ F∗. There is a
function N(~s) so that a˜n(~s) > K for all ~s ∈ F∗, n ≥ N(~s). Let Fn := {~s ∈ F∗ : N(~s) ≤ n}.
We have Fn ↑ F∗ so there is some N where P[FN |ω = 1] ≥ 12P[F∗|ω = 1] = . We claim that
FN ⊆ EN . This is because at every ~s ∈ FN , N ≥ N(s) so a˜N(s) > K. And yet this would
say P[EN |ω = 1] ≥ , which contradicts P[En|ω = 1] <  for every n. Therefore, the event
where a˜n diverges to ∞ must have 0 probability conditional on ω = 1. So by symmetry this
also shows there is 0 ex-ante probability of a˜n diverging to ∞.
A similar argument establishes a˜n diverges to −∞ with 0 probability.
The only remaining case is a˜n converging to some real number. By way of contradiction,
assume this event has probability 2 > 0 conditional on ω = 1.
By algebra, we expand the difference in consecutive log-actions a˜n+1 − a˜n as the sum of
some independent Gaussians,
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a˜n+1 − a˜n = s˜n+1 − (1− δ)s˜n − (1− 2δ)δ ·
n−2∑
j=0
[(2δ)j] · s˜n−1−j
The limiting distribution of RHS conditional on ω = 1 is N (0, σˆ2) for some σˆ > 0. We
can pick h > 0 small enough so N (0, σˆ2) ∈ [−h/2, h/2] has probability less than . So there
exists N1 so that for each n ≥ N1, P[|a˜n+1 − a˜n| < h|ω = 1] < . Write Gn for the event
where |a˜n+1 − a˜n| < h.
To derive a contradiction, write J∗ := {~s ∈ R∞ : limn→∞ a˜n(~s) = c for some c ∈ R}.
We have functions N2 : J∗ → N and c : J∗ → R so that whenever ~s ∈ J∗ and n ≥ N2(~s),
|a˜n(~s) − c(~s)| < 12h. Let Jn := {~s ∈ J∗ : N2(~s) ≤ n}. We have Jn ↑ J∗ so there is some N2
where P[JN2 |ω = 1] ≥ 12P[J∗|ω = 1] = . It is without loss to pick N2 ≥ N1. We claim that
JN2 ⊆ GN2 . This is because for each s ∈ JN2 , N2(s) ≤ N2 so |a˜N2(s) − c(s)| < 12h and also
|a˜N2+1(s)− c(s)| < 12h. By triangle inequality, |a˜N2(s)− a˜N2+1(s)| < h. But this would show
P[GN2|ω = 1] ≥ , which is a contradiction since N2 ≥ N1.
OA 1.3 Proof of Proposition A.3
Proof. On this network, the coefficients bn,i satisfy the recurrence relation
bn,i = δqdbn−1,i + δ2(1 + qs)bn−2,i
whenever n ≥ 3. As in the proof of Proposition 4, there exist constants ξ+, ξ−, c+, c− so that
bn,i = c+ξn−i+ + c−ξn−i− ,
where ξ± are now the solutions to the polynomial x2 − δqdx− δ2(1 + qs) = 0 and c+, c− are
constants that we can determine from b2,1 and b3,1. We compute
ξ± = δ · qd ±
√
4qs + qd + 4
2 ,
so that ξ+ > |ξ−|.
The convergence of beliefs now depends on how δ compares to δ0(qs, qd) = 2qd+√4qs+qd+4 .
The results about convergence in the first statement follow as in the proof of Proposition
A.2. More precisely, the proof of Proposition A.2 depends on the network structure only
through two conditions: (A) for every  > 0, there exist K > 0 so that P[a˜n > K|ω = 1] < 
for every n; (B) for every  > 0, there exists an h > 0 so that P[|a˜n+1 − a˜n| < h|ω = 1] < 
for every n. We now verify these two conditions in the context of Proposition A.3.
To verify (A), we have a˜n =
∑n
i=1 bn,i · s˜i =
∑n
j=1 bj,1 · s˜n−j+1, where we used bn,i = bn−i+1,1.
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Let µn :=
∑n
j=1 bj,1 and σ2n :=
∑n
j=1 b
2
j,1 and we have
a˜n|ω = 1 ∼ N (µn · E[s˜1|ω = 1], σ2n · Var[s˜1|ω = 1]).
But whenever δ < δ0(qs, qd), we have |ξ−| < |ξ+| < 1, so:
µn =
n∑
j=1
bj,1 ≤
n∑
j=1
|bj,1| ≤
∞∑
j=1
(|c+|+ |c−|) · ξn+ =: µ∞ <∞
σ2n =
n∑
j=1
b2j,1 ≤
n∑
j=1
b2j,1 ≤
∞∑
j=1
(|c+|+ |c−|)2 · ξ2n+ =: σ2∞ <∞
This implies for every K > µ∞,
P[N (µ∞ · E[s˜1|ω = 1], σ2∞ · Var[s˜1|ω = 1]) > K|ω = 1]
>P[N (µn · E[s˜1|ω = 1], σ2n · Var[s˜1|ω = 1]) > K|ω = 1]
=P[a˜n > K|ω = 1]
Clearly we may choose K > µ∞ > 0 large enough so that
P[N (µ∞ · E[s˜1|ω = 1], σ2∞ · Var[s˜1|ω = 1]) > K|ω = 1] < .
To verify (B),
a˜n+1 − a˜n =
n∑
i=1
dn+1,is˜i + ·s˜n+1
where dn+1,i is the difference in weight, dn+1,i = bn+1,i − bn,i.
Here [∑ni=1 dn+1,is˜i] is some Gaussian random variable and s˜n+1 is independent of it.
Even if the first piece ∑ni=1 dn+1,is˜i were always 0, clearly we may pick h small enough so
P[|s˜n+1| < h|ω = 1] < .
The proofs of the results in the case δ > δ0(qs, qd) are essentially the same as the proof
of Proposition 4.
OA 1.4 Proof of Proposition A.4
Proof. Fixing any realization of the agents as naive agents and autarkic agents, the profile
of actions played is the same as if all agents are naive and all links beginning at agents who
were autarkic are given weight zero. The number of paths from a naive agent i to an agent j
in this modified network is equal to q(1− q)f(i,j), where f(i, j) is the number of naive agents
between i and j (without counting agents i and j).
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By a simple computation, we find that
a˜n =
n∑
i=1
q(1 + q)f(n,n−i+1)s˜i.
Let
xj =
n1∑
i=1
(1 + q)n1−is˜j(n1+n2)+i +
n2∑
i=n1+1
s˜j(n1+n2)+i.
Then
a˜k(n1+n2)+1 =
k∑
j=1
q(1 + q)(k−j)n1xj
and similarly for other naive agents. It follows that agent actions have the same sign as
∞∑
j=1
(1 + q)−jxj
for n sufficiently large. The remainder of the proof follows as in Proposition 3.
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OA 2 Simulations Using Random Networks
In this paper, we have focused on a learning model with a deterministic network, where non-
integral weights on network edges Mi,j ∈ [0, 1] can be assigned either a noise interpretation
or a generation interpretation, as discussed in Section 2.3. However, it is also natural to
consider a random network in which edge (i, j) materializes with probability Mi,j, where
realizations of the network edges and the private signals are mutually independent. To
verify the robustness of our conclusions in Section 4, we performed simulations where Mi,j
are assigned random network interpretations. These simulations suggest that our results
extend to this random network interpretation.
We first conducted simulations using Gaussian private signals on Erdős–Rényi random
networks. We chose a signal variance of σ2 = 2. For each linking probability p ∈ {0.1, 0.2, ..., 1.0},
we simulated 100,000 joint realizations of the Erdős–Rényi random network and private sig-
nals for a society of 150 agents. We report the probabilities of mislearning in Figure OA.1,
where we find increasing link probability increases the likelihood of mislearning, in agreement
with Proposition 3.
link
probability
chance of
mislearning
0.1 0.03043
0.2 0.06982
0.3 0.09923
0.4 0.12346
0.5 0.13796
0.6 0.15270
0.7 0.16580
0.8 0.17776
0.9 0.18595
1.0 0.19349
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Figure OA.1: Simulation results for the probability of mislearning on Erdős–Rényi networks
with Gaussian signals of variance σ2 = 2. We simulated 150 agents in each society and
performed 100,000 simulations at each link probability.
To further test the robustness of our results to a different signal structure, we consider
a case where the space of signals is S = [0, 1] and the density functions over signals are
f0(s) = 2− 2s and f1(s) = 2s in states ω = 0 and ω = 1 respectively. This is the triangular
distribution that leads to the inference P[ω = 1|s] = s and was previously used in Eyster
and Rabin (2010) to illustrate the probability of mislearning for naive agents on a complete
network. In Figure OA.2, we find that the conclusion of Proposition 3 continues to hold
on Erdős–Rényi random networks with triangular signals: higher link probability leads to
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higher chance of mislearning. Notice the probability of mislearning at a linking probability
of 1 is 11.26%, which is similar to the simulation result of 11.15% of mislearning at the 10th
naive player in Table 1 of Eyster and Rabin (2010).
link
probability
chance of
mislearning
0.1 0.00492
0.2 0.02078
0.3 0.03723
0.4 0.05230
0.5 0.06401
0.6 0.07699
0.7 0.08531
0.8 0.09716
0.9 0.10333
1.0 0.11257
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Figure OA.2: Simulation results for the probability of mislearning on Erdős–Rényi networks
with triangular signals. We simulated 150 agents in each society and performed 100,000
simulations at each link probability.
In Figures OA.3 and OA.4, we report our simulation results for random networks under
the two-groups model, with Gaussian and triangular signals respectively. The conclusions
of Proposition 4 appear generally robust to this shift to random networks and new signal
structure. For both signal structures, increasing within-group link probability and between-
group link probability increases mislearning. Also, for each signal structure and at each
(qs, qd) ∈ {0.1, ..., 0.9} × {0.1, ..., 0.9}, we checked whether mislearning is more prevalent at
(qs + 0.1, qd) or (qs, qd + 0.1). Under each signal structure, we found that out of the 81
cells increasing qd led to more mislearning than increasing qs in 79 cases, in agreement with
Proposition 4. The results for the two remaining cells may be attributed to noise in the
simulation outcomes.
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Mislearning in Two−Groups Random Networks with Gaussian Signals
within−group link probability
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0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.20
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
1.0 0.15835 0.16281 0.16923 0.17262 0.17735 0.17914 0.18462 0.18786 0.19262 0.19349
0.9 0.14852 0.15267 0.16231 0.16539 0.17125 0.17527 0.17741 0.18288 0.18595 0.18800
0.8 0.13963 0.14809 0.15019 0.15738 0.16311 0.16961 0.17222 0.17776 0.17976 0.18047
0.7 0.13093 0.13632 0.14499 0.15190 0.15559 0.16081 0.16580 0.16835 0.17240 0.17553
0.6 0.11733 0.12631 0.13623 0.14206 0.14847 0.15270 0.15791 0.16356 0.16705 0.17197
0.5 0.10329 0.11553 0.12561 0.13114 0.13796 0.14558 0.14978 0.15517 0.15832 0.16268
0.4 0.09135 0.10234 0.11445 0.12346 0.12992 0.13754 0.14266 0.14636 0.15101 0.15598
0.3 0.07335 0.08909 0.09923 0.11006 0.11744 0.12711 0.13295 0.13680 0.14377 0.14779
0.2 0.05323 0.06982 0.08606 0.09677 0.10489 0.11394 0.12094 0.12849 0.13290 0.13907
0.1 0.03043 0.04974 0.06723 0.08026 0.09182 0.10211 0.11032 0.11815 0.12301 0.12712
Figure OA.3: Simulation results for the probability of mislearning on two-groups random
networks with Gaussian signals of variance σ2 = 2. We simulated 150 agents in each society
and performed 100,000 simulations at each link probability.
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Mislearning in Two−Groups Random Networks with Triangular Signals
within−group link probability
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0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
1.0 0.05579 0.06227 0.07250 0.07677 0.08348 0.09091 0.09908 0.10337 0.10719 0.11191
0.9 0.05228 0.05902 0.06698 0.07414 0.08088 0.08891 0.09308 0.10002 0.10483 0.11080
0.8 0.04914 0.05677 0.06475 0.07248 0.07700 0.08420 0.09043 0.09614 0.10124 0.10705
0.7 0.04301 0.05101 0.05983 0.06583 0.07509 0.08097 0.08746 0.09361 0.09873 0.10336
0.6 0.03868 0.04622 0.05384 0.06256 0.07078 0.07502 0.08236 0.09036 0.09439 0.10167
0.5 0.03201 0.04139 0.04944 0.05878 0.06346 0.07234 0.08046 0.08492 0.09209 0.09592
0.4 0.02578 0.03494 0.04431 0.05219 0.06007 0.06906 0.07365 0.08110 0.08670 0.09389
0.3 0.01821 0.02840 0.03719 0.04574 0.05401 0.06287 0.06991 0.07623 0.08195 0.08843
0.2 0.01122 0.02070 0.02918 0.03825 0.04820 0.05704 0.06337 0.07053 0.07714 0.08553
0.1 0.00472 0.01291 0.02210 0.03114 0.04079 0.04954 0.05626 0.06560 0.07345 0.07724
Figure OA.4: Simulation results for the probability of mislearning on two-groups random
networks with triangular signals. We simulated 150 agents in each society and performed
100,000 simulations at each link probability.
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OA 3 Experimental Details
OA 3.1 Further Details on the Experimental Design
In addition to comprehension questions, we restricted to subjects located in the United States
who had completed at least 50 previous MTurk tasks with a lifetime approval rate of at least
90%. Subjects were not permitted to participate in more than one round of our experiment.
There were at most 15 subjects who completed fewer than 10 trials, implying a completion
rate of at least 98.5%, and these subjects were excluded and replaced by a new subject.
The three comprehension questions were: one question in which subjects observed player
1, who agreed with their private signal; one question in which the subjects had no social
observations and their signal was informative; and one question in which subjects observed
player 1 and received the uninformative signal 0. Subjects were instructed to answer assum-
ing player 1 followed their private signal.
Instructions and an example choice follow. To avoid confusion, the instructions were
modified for player 1 in each round to exclude discussion of social observations.
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This is round 1 (out of 10).
Your signal: -3.3968.
Based on your signal alone, there is 84.53% chance the direction is LEFT,
15.47% chance the direction is RIGHT.
Your observations:
Player 1 guessed RIGHT
Player 3 guessed RIGHT
Player 4 guessed LEFT
Player 5 guessed LEFT
Player 7 guessed RIGHT
Player 8 guessed RIGHT
Player 9 guessed LEFT
Player 10 guessed LEFT
Player 11 guessed LEFT
Player 12 guessed LEFT
Player 13 guessed LEFT
Player 15 guessed LEFT
Player 16 guessed LEFT
Player 17 guessed RIGHT
Player 18 guessed LEFT
What is your guess about the direction this round?
LEFT
RIGHT
 >> 
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